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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES
The increasing usage of carbon fiber (CF) composites in commercial
aircraft has led to awareness of a potential, though not necessarily
substantial risk. Air carrier operations will occasionally result in
accidental fires and/or explosions. If the aircraft is carrying carbon
fiber composites in the structure, then some of these fibers may be
burned away by an intense fire, rise in the convection plume and be
dispersed over a large area, depending upon the atmospheric conditions
and the wind direction. If there are buildings or other facilities
located in the path of the carbon fiber cloud, and if these buildings
contain electronic equipment which is potentially vulnerable to the
fibers, then there is a possibility that the fibers will penetrate
these buildings, damage the equipment and thus result in economic
losses to the residents or proprietors of these facilities.
The objective of the commercial aviation risk analysis was the
assessment of potential economic losses due to CF releases through 1993.
To meet this objective, several. related objectives were formulated. In
order to quantify the amount of carbon fiber that could be found on air-
craft, it was necessary to project the potential usage of carbon fiber
composites in commercial aircraft through 1993. In order to estimate
the frequency with which such fibers could be released, it was necessary
to investigate the incidence of commercial aircraft accidents with fire and/
or explosion, in terms of both their location and frequency. In order
to describe the physical mechanisms whereby fibers could be transported
over the surrounding area, dispersion models were developed. Estimates
were made of potential economic losses in situations where the accidentally
released carbon fibers were able to penetrate buildings and equipment
cabinets, creating damaging short circuits. In addition, it was. necessary
to explicitly show the uncertainties in the assumptions that entered into
the risk analysis, and to test the sensitivity of the projected losses to
those input parameters.
This report represents the second phase of a risk analysis program
performed for NASA-Langley Research Center and incorporates some model-
ling techniques and data developed during the first phase. The major
results of the risk assessment are described below:
1.2 CARBON FIBER USAGE
In order to describe the usage of carbon fiber composites in aircraft t
we divided the commercial aircraft into three categories of jets--small,
medium and large jets. Each of the jet aircraft produced by the major air-
frame manufacturers was assigned to one of these classes. The study did
not consider other classes of aircraft, such as turbo-propst since there is
expected to be little t if anYt composite usage on this type of aircraft.
The projections were based on estimates obtained from the three major
U.S. airframe manufacturers t McDonnell Douglas t Lockheed and Boeing. They
estimated both the fleet mix; that is the relative numbers of different
sizes of aircraft in service in 1993 t and the potential usage of carbon
fiber composites for each of these classes. As indicated in Table 1-1,
roughly half of the aircraft in service in 1993 will be large jets, the
majority of which will be using carbon fiber composites. The projected
weight of actual carbon fibers, including the epoxy binding, ranges'
from only 11 kg. on some of the small aircraft to as much as 15,600 kg.
on some of the large aircraft. For the purposes of the risk analysis,
these estimated ranges were used to develop a probability distribution
for the amount of carbon fiber involved in an aircraft accident.
1.3 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
The typical conditions surrounding a severe fire and/or explosion
in the case of an air carrier accident were investigated through use of
i
the National Transportation Safety Board accident and incident statistics
for the years 1968-1976. Using their records, we created a data base of
aircraft accidents that listed for each accident the phase of operation,
the location of the accident, the weather conditions at the time of the
accident, the nature of the fire, and other relevant details. This data
base was augmented with the help of the airframe manufacturers who provided
2
TABLE 1-1
PROJECTED 1993 USAGE OF CARBON FIBER
_. __.
COMPOSITES IN COMMERCIAL AI RCRAFT*
Size of Jet
•
Small Medium Large TOTAL
Number of Aircraft in Service 560 780 1399 2739
Number of Aircraft Using CF 100 754 1127 1981
Composites
IComposite Mass per Aircraft (KG):
Min. 11 215 155
Max. 183 3781 15,652
* Based~on estimates of airframe manufacturers
additional data on accident characteristics, such as fire duration, that
would affect carbon fiber release conditions. We then utilized these
data to determine the distribution of possible accident characteristics.
We found that almost half of the severe accidents involving fire
occurred during the landing phase. The take-off phase accounts for one-
quarter of these accidents, with the remainder being distributed in either
the static/taxi or cruise phase. Since most cruise accidents occur over
unpopulated areas, we considered only a small fraction of cruise accidents
in the analysis. However, the static, take-off or landing accidents
were all associated with specific airport locations. From an analysis of
the location of accidents relative to airport runways, we found that over
80% of accidents occur within 10 kilometers of the airport, and in fact
60% of accidents occur at the airport. We also investigated the angle
between the accident location and the line of the runway to establish
more precisely the potential locations of such accidents.
Historically, there have been about 3.8 accidents per year involving
jet air carriers. Although air carrier operations are gradually increasing
in number, the accident frequency appears to be relatively constant from
year-to-year. Therefore, we did not project any increase in accidents
through 1993. Based on the expected fraction of the air carrier fleet
that would be carrying carbon fiber in 1993, the projected frequency of
incidents involving fire on aircraft carrying composites of carbon fibers
would be approximately 2.7 per year in 1993.
There were two different types of scenarios used to describe possible
carbon fiber release situations in the aftermath of an air carrier incident.
One of them was a simple fire plume in which the fibers were carried aloft by
the plume and then dispersed. The second was the fire and explosion case
in which there was a sudden rapid conflagration of fuel resembling an
explosion, and therefore much more rapid burning of composite and a concen-
trated release of fibers over a short period of time. Based on the 92 accident
data base compiled by the airframe manufacturers, we estinlated conservatively
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that at most 5% of air carrier accidents would result in explosive
release of carbon fibers of the type described.
1.4 CARBON FIBER RELEASE CONDITIONS
The extent of dispersion of carbon fibers from a burning aircraft
and the level of resulting exposures to the surrounding area were influ-
enced by the release conditions at the time of the accident. Release
conditions include the weather conditions, such as atmospheric stability
class, wind velocity and wind direction, as well as the duration and
the intensity of the fire. With the help of the accident data base
compiled by the airframe manufacturers we were able to develop distribu-
tionsfor several of the important release variables. These included
the duration of the fire, the percent of fuel burned, and the percent of
carbon fiber involved, all of which were found to be correlated. Roughly
speaking, the greater the amount of fuel burned, the longer the duration
of the burn, and the greater the potential carbon fiber involvement. In
addition, the amount of fuel on board was estimated for different phases
of operation and different aircraft size categories, and the amount of
carbon fibers on board was estimated for the three size classes of air~
craft. This allowed calculation of the actual amount of fuel burned and
the actual amount of carbon fiber involved.
Even though an aircraft may be carrying over 15,000 kg. of CF
composite, the amount of carbon fibers that could be released in a fire
is significantly less, partly because of the fact that not all the carbon
fibers can be released as single fibers in a burn, and partly because the
tentire aircraft structure will not necessarily be involved in the fire.
Based on experimental findings, it was estimated that not more then 1%
of the carbon fibers involved in a fire would be released in most fire
plumes, and that not more than 2.5% would be released in most fire and
explosion scenarios. These are conservative estimates using the best
judgment and interpretation of the experiments conduoted by NASA and
other groups on burning composite materials.
5
1.5 ECONOMIC LOSS ESTIMATES
To assess the potential consequences of carbon fiber-related equip-
ment failures, an economic loss analysis was performed .. A broad range
of facility categories were identified as being potentially susceptible
to equipment failure and/or business interruption, as shown in Table 1-2.
Detailed site visits were performed at selected facilities corresponding
to most of these categories in order to characterize the quantity,
locations, and types of vulnerable equipment, to examine the ventilation
and filtration systems in use, and to estimate the losses which mig~t be
incurred under various failure scenarios. In general it appeared that
most facilities were well prepared for servicing routine equipment
failures, and that important units of electronic equipment were usually
protected from intrusion of foreign particles.
On the basis of the site visits, a set of loss estimates was
constructed for each combination of equipment and facility type. The
consequences of a single failure were generally low, rarely exceeding
$50,000 in magnitude. Furthermore, the probability of failures was
found to be low, given that maximum accidental carbon fiber exposures
were expected to be on the order of 107 fiber-seconds per cubic meter.
Airborne exposure transfer functions were estimated for the various
facilities, and were generally found to reduce the outside exposure
by at least two orders of magnitude. However, the mean inside exposures
required to damage electronic equipment were estimated at 108 or more
for most equipment categories. Hence, using an exponential failure
model, the likelihood of a significant number of failures during a CF
exposure would be negligible.
To apply the economic loss data for estimation of national risks,
the 26 large hub airports as designated by the FAA were used as a basis
for risk analysis. From census data, the numbers of facilities in each
category were enumerated within a circular grid of forty sectors sur-
rounding each hub airport. In this way, individual accidents could be
simulated, dispersion models could be used to estimate the carbon fiber
6
TABLE 1-2
POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE FACI LlTIES
1. Residences
2. Manufacturers
3. Transportation
4. Communication
5. Services
6. General
- Electronic Equipment
- Computers
- Aerospace
- Aircraft and Air Traffic Control
- Mass Transit
- Railways
- Telephone
- RadiorrV/Microwave
- Post Offices
- Fire/Police
- Financial/Insurance
- Software/EDP
- Hospitals
- Retail Outlets
- Office Buildings
-·1 ndustrial Plants
exposures in each geographic sector, and the number of facilities affected
could be determined. The actual simulation procedure is described below.
1.6 NATIONAL RISK PROFILE
The necessary inputs for the development of a risk profile for CF
releases included the accident characteristics, the release conditions,
the dispersion model, and the characteristics of vulnerable facilities.
Once these elements had been assembled, we performed a Monte Carlo simu-
lation of potential aircraft accidents at each of the 26 large hub air-
ports. We used the Monte Carlo method to develop an individual risk
profile for each airport and then these risk profiles were combined into
a national risk profile. (A risk profile is a graph indicating the
probability of exceeding various levels of dollar loss.) The Monte Carlo
procedure worked in the following manner: It simulated a large number of
accidents, on the order of hundreds or thousands of accidents, and for
each one drew from probability distributions a set of conditions for that
accident. The aircraft and incident details, such as the size of the plane
and the phase of the operation, were randomly drawn, and these in turn
influenced the probable accident location, the likelihood of a delayed
explosion, and the assumed release conditions. By repeating the simula-
tion many times, we generated the full range of possible accident types
and thus developed a distribution of the potential accident results.
There were several important assumptions that entered into the risk
analysis: First, atmospheric conditions were assumed to remain constant
during the dispersion of the carbon fiber cloud, since it would be too
complex to simulate different atmospheric conditions in different geo-
graphic sectors. The assumption is not expected to introduce any bias
into the risk analysis since the variation of atmospheric conditions
will sometimes increase and sometimes decrease the resulting exposures.
We also assumed that there was no precipitation, which is a conservative
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assumption since if precipitation did occur it might wash out some of
the fibers, resulting in lower airborne exposures on the ground. Another
major assumption was that for a given facility category all facilities
were equal in size, equipment inventory, and financial characteristics.
The variation in facility characteristics would introduce a little more
variation into the risk profile but should not affect the results too
greatly because of the large number of facilities involved thrit would
tend to average each other out. The last majo~ assumption was that all
equipment was activated and that failures oCGurred immediately after
exposure. Since some fraction of the electronic equipment exposed will
not be activated, this tends to be a conservative assumption. On the
other hand, there is a phenomenon of post-exposure vulnerability, in which
fibers that are deposited upon equipment do not cause a problem immediately
but will affect the equipment when it is turned on at a later date. This
phenomenon was not modeled explicitly, but it is taken into account by
assuming continuous activation and failures immediately after exposure.'
The resulting annual risk profile for economic losses due to air
carrier fires involving carbon fibers is shown in Figure 1-1. The
horizontal axis shows the total economic losses in dollars as a results
of carbon fiber accidents during a given year. The vertical axis shows
the annual probability of exceeding each dollar loss value. For example,
an annual loss of approximately one thousand dollars would be exceeded
with a probabi 1ity of 10-1 , in other words once every ten years. An
annual loss of ten thousand dollars would be exceeded about once every three
hundred years. The expected annual losses due to CF released from ~ir carrier
fires in 1993 was about $470. It should be noted this included only those
losses incurred by failures of equipment in the civilian sector.
1.7 CONFIDENCE ESTIMATES
The confidence bounds on the risk profile (Figure l-l) show the sensi-
tivity of the risk estimates to variations in the input parameters. These
confidence bounds are based upon several different sources of uncertainty:
the statistical error due to the simulation method, the statistical error in
9
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FIGURE 1-1
NATIONAL ANNUAL RISK PROFILE FOR CARBON FIBER
RELEASES FROM COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS
(1993 CF Utilization)
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estimation of accident frequency, and the modeling errors due to uncer-
tainty about input parameters. The former two sources of uncertainty
were judged to contribute less than an order of magnitude to the confi-
dence bound at the high-loss extreme, and considerablY less than that
at average loss values. The confidence bounds are wider at high loss
value~ bec~use the simulation may not have generated an extremely
unlikely high-loss event even among thousands of simulated events.
To estimate the modeling errors, we performed a sensitivity analysis
by varying several of the key input parameters. Of the three parameters
tested, the largest increase in risk was obtained by setting the composite
on the aircraft at its highest possible value, 15,652 kg. This increased
the mean loss per incident by a factor of about 7; Restricting the
simulation model to only explosive releases increased the loss statistics
by a factor of 2 or 3, while setting the atmospheric stability class to
E (moderately stable weather) increased the loss distribution only
slightly. The two latter conditions are those which tend to result in
highest exposures downwind of the release point. We concluded that
modeling errors contributed less than an order of magnitude to the
uncertainty of the risk profile. As a final verification of the simula-
tion results, we compared the national conditional profile for dollar
losses per incident against a risk profile obtained through an alternative
analytic approach, based upon a Poisson model of equipment failures.
The two methods agreed fairly well, with their mean values differing by
a factor of less than 3.
11
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW
Carbon fiber (CF) composites are being used to an increasing extent
in commercial aircraft, due to their excellent structural properties.
Since carbon fibers are highly conductive, a potential risk has been
identified in the event that an aircraft with CF composite structures is
involved in an accidental fire. If carbon fibers are released from the
fire, they could disperse in the atmosphere and eventually cause damaging
short circuits in electronic equipment at remote locations. This phenom-
enon could conceivably result in economic losses ranging from repair of
failed equipment to interruption of business operations, and could affect
many segments of society. The purpose of this study was to assess the
risks presented to the nation as a whole by the use of CF composites in
commercial aircraft, in terms of the potential economic losses from air
carrier accidents.
To support the investigation, experimental data from a number of
different sources were used, including tests of CF releases from burning
composite structures and vulnerability tests for selected equipment.
Accident reports for commercial air carrier fires were used to generate
information about the frequency and severity of fires and/or explosions.
Field surveys were conducted in the vicinity of several major airports
in order to characterize the types of facilities that might be exposed
to carbon fiber releases. Census data were employed to enumerate the
numbers of residential and commercial establishments in the vicinity
of the 26 large hub airports identified by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration. These data formed part of the input to a Monte Carlo simulation
model, which calculated the probability of different amounts of loss
given that an accidental release of CF has occurred. Using these results,
a national risk profile was developed, which estimated the annual losses
due ts CF usage in commercial aircraft based upon the anticipated usage
in 1993.
12
The present report represents an enhancement of an earlier Phase I
risk assessment [1], incorporating both an improved technical approach
and more accurate input data. The major areas of enhancement were as
follows:
• Incorporation of improved forecasts of 1993 jet aircraft
fleet mix and carbon fiber usage.
• Development of more accurate estimates for aircraft
structural damage and CF release conditions.
• Detailed field visits and vulnerability analyses for
specific facility categories, resulting in better loss
estimates.
• Improvement of confidence in the risk profile through
detailed sensitivity analyses and application of an
alternate risk estimation methodology.
• Refinement of carbon fiber dispersion models to provide
more accurate exposure estimates.
• Extension of the risk analysis to address CF usage in
General aviation
Surface transportation vehicles
The latter enhancement is described separately in two reports dealing
with general aviation-related risks [2] and motor vehicle-related risks
[3]. The present report documents the analysis of aircraft accidents,
CF rqleases, and economic impacts of equipment failures, and then
combines these results into a national assessment for air carrier-related
risks.
2.2 OBJECTIVES
The major objective of the commercial aviation risk assessment was
to develop a national risk profile for the potential economic losses
through 1993 due to CF releases from commercial aircraft fires in the U.S.
To accomplish this task, the following sub-ojbectives were formulated:
• Project the potential usage of CF composites in commercial
aircraft through 1993.
13
• Investigate the incidence of commercial aircraft fires
and/or explosions within the U.S.
• Model the potential release and dispersion of carbon
fibers from a fire or a fire followed by an explosion.
• Estimate the resulting exposures in the area surrounding
accident location due to dispersion of fibers in the
atmosphere.
• Identify equipment and facilities in the vicinity of 26
large hub airports which are potentially vulnerable to
damage from carbon fibers.
• Estimate potential economic losses due to carbon fibers
penetrating and damaging electronic equipment.
• Create a national risk profile for annual dollar losses
by extrapolating from the analysis of the 26 large hubs.
• Show explicitly the uncertainties and assumptions used
in the risk assessment.
• Examine the sensitivity of the risk profile to changes
in the input parameters.
2.3 METHODOLOGY
To satisfy the above objectives, a methodology was developed which
analyzes the entire sequence of relevant physical events and then simulates
these events repeatedly to obtain a probability distribution of the result-
ing losses. The methodology, which was largely created during Phase I, may
be understood by referring to Figure 2-1.
The specific airports selected for detailed analysis were the 26 large
hubs which account for a majority of air traffic in the U.S. As shown in
Figure 2-2, the large hubs account for approximately 70% of domestic passenger
enplanements. Using aviation statistics in conjunction with airport charac-
teristics, the probability of an accident with fire involving a commercial
jet aircraft was computed for each large hub. Probability distributions
for accident characteristics and carbon fiber release conditions were
developed, incorporating information about CF composite utilization and
typical severity and duration of fires. These conditions formed the
14
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basis for release scenarios, which included the lncation of the accident,
the total CF mass released, and the type of release - either a fire plume
o~ an explosive release.
The release scenarios were fed as input to either of two dispersion
models, which took into account the probable atmospheric condition$
surrounding the accident. Both the fire plume dispersion model and the
fire-explosion dispersion model assumed that all CF was released as
single fibers with a uniform settling velocity. Using Pasquill-Gifford
dispersion parameters, these models calculated the resulting exposure
at various distances from the accident locations. Exposure distributions
were determined within 40 sectors of a circular grid centered at the air-
port. Wind directions played an important role in determining the sectors
with maximum exposure.
By means of field work and census data, the potentially vulnerable
facilities were enumerated in each of these geographic sectors. Facilities
were divided into industrial categories, and private residences were also
considered. The amount of electronic equipment exposed was then estimated
by facility. Penetration of fibers into building interiors was analyzed,
and the vulnerability of equipment to failure was modeled in probabilistic
fashion, based upon experimental data. This permitted computations of the
expected number of equipment failures. Finally, by means of an economic
analysis of various possible losses, the total dollar damage resulting
from CF exposure was estimated.
The simulation model generated a risk profile by repeatedly and
randomly selecting accident scenarios and determining the resulting
losses. This was done for each large hub, and then the 26 risk profiles
were extrapolated to yield a national risk profile, which also incorporated
the risk from cruise accidents between airports. The risk profiles that
were generated involved a number of assumptions which have some uncertainty
attached to them. The overall intent was to develop conservative risk
estimates which would overstate rather than understate the risk, and to
provide quantitative results which were useful for decision-making given
17
our current state of knowledge. To test the effect of certain assumptions,
some of the input parameters were varied in a sensitivity analysis. An
alternative risk estimation method, based on a Poisson model, was also
applied. The resulting risk profiles did not deviate greatly from the
base analysis, indicating that the results can be interpreted as reasonably
accurate.
2.4 REVIEW OF RISK ANALYSIS PRINCIPLES
The concept of risk can be defined as the potential for realization
of unwanted negative consequences of an event or activity. In the case
of this study, the unwanted negative consequences are the potential
economic losses due to electronic equipment failure. The event or
activity in question is the operation of commercial aviation aircraft
utilizing carbon fiber composites. If risk is due to the presence of
some causative agent, such as carbon fibers, then the degree of exposure*
is measured by the amount of that agent which is potentially active.
In the past decade, an increasing amount of attention has been
paid to problem areas involving activities with uncertain outcomes which
might engender large risks. In order to deal with these problems the
field of risk management has been created and developed. Risk management
is a methodical scientific approach towards dealing with such risks.
The quantitative aspects of risk management are often referred to as risk
analysis. Examples of the application of this approach are in the areas
of nuclear reactor safety and transportation of hazardous chemicals,
such as liquefied natural gases.
The practice of risk management involves three bastc steps: risk
identification, risk measurement, and risk control. Potential risks
can be identified through experience, judgment, or experimentation. In
the case of the carbon fiber problem the nature of the risk is fairly
*In this case, exposure is the time integral of concentration, with
units of fiber-seconds per cubic meter.
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well understood. The major challenge lies in risk measurement, that is,
in determining the frequency of occurrence of events. Thus, the purpose
of risk analysis is to create an analytic framework permitting measure-
ment of exposure and risk. Finally, if the measured risk is considered
sufficiently great, control measures may be deemed necessary. Control
measures would consist of any modifications to the mechanism of risk
resulting in a reduction in the measured risk.
There are various possible representations which can be used to
quantify risk. One possible representation is the expected value of
losses over a given period of time. However, in order to deal with risks
which may fluctuate over a wide range of losses and a correspondingly
wide range of frequencies of occurrence, a preferred method of presenta-
tion is the risk profile. As discussed earlier, a risk profile is a
graphical display of risk showing the probability distribution for
exceeding various levels of unwanted impacts. A hypothetical example
of a risk profile is shown in Figure 2-3. The activity in questiqn
is labeled Activity 1 and the risk profile for Activity 1 shows that
economic impact can vary from $100,000 to $10 million with probabilities
ranging from one in a thousand to one in ten thousand. This risk
profile may be compared against other profiles for different types of
events, such as the damage from tornadoes. In the diagram, two comparator
risk profiles are shown. If risk control options are exercised, it may
be possible to reduce the risk from Activity 1 as shown by the dotted
curve at the bottom. The vertical lines are confidence bounds which
show the uncertainty in the estimates of risk. Even though the actual
risk may fall anywhere between these confidence bounds, the risk profile
can still be used as an effective decision-making tool since it both
quantifies in an absolute sense the risks imposed by Activity 1 and
permits a comparison of these risks relative to other known risks.
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3. CARBON FIBER USAGE FORECASTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the forecasts for U.S. aircraft fleet mixes
and carbon fiber utilization in 1993, which were used as inputs to the
release models described in Chapter 5. The forecasts given in this
chapter were calculated directly from data supplied by the three major
airframe manufacturers, Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell-Douglas. Some
of these data have been reproduced in the tables in this chapter, in-
cluding carbon fiber usage forecasts by section of the aircraft for each
type of plane expected to be introduced by 1993. It is anticipated that
many structural parts of commercial aircraft will be constructed from
carbon fiber composites by 1993. These parts include horizontal and
vertical stabilizers, rudders, elevators, flaps and supports, spoilers,
ailerons, nacelles, secondary structures, wing boxes, floor beams and
posts, wheel well doors, wing fairings, fuselages, and doors. Details
of these usage forecasts are presented below.
3.2 1993 FLEET MIX AND GROWTH
Two significant trends in aircraft fleet mix will be observed be-
tween now and 1993, according to the predictions of the three airframe
manufacturers. These are (a) a decline in the small jet fleet, and (b)
a significant increase in the large jet fleet.
The fleet of large jets will include the present generation of jumbo
jets: the Boeing 747, the Douglas DC-10, and the Lockheed L-1011. Ac-
cording to the airframe manufacturers, by 1993 the large jet fleet will
number 1399, of which 1127 will be using carbon fibers.
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Medium jets include those aircraft seating between 150 and 250 pas-
sengers. Medium aircraft that will be using carbon fibers by 1993 will
consist largely of a new generation of medium jets. These include the
Boeing 757, 767, and 777, as well as a newly-designed medium jet manu-
facturered by McDonnell-Douglas. According to the airframe manufacturers
the medium size jet fleet will number 780 by 1993, of which 754 will be
using carbon fibers.
The small jet fleet includes those aircraft carrying less than 150
passengers. Although this classification is a very large part of the pre-
sent fleet it will represent only a small portion of the 1993 fleet. In
addition, only a small portion of the 1993 fleet will be using carbon
fibers. These planes will include newly manufactured versions of the
Boeing 727, 737,and to a lesser extent, the Boeing 707. According to
the airframe manufacturers, the small aircraft fleet will number 560 in
1993, of which 100 aircraft will use carbon fibers.*
These forecasts are summarized in Table 3-1.
3.3 DISTRIBUTION OF COMPOSITE BY AIRCRAFT TYPE
Each of the three airframe manufacturers developed forecasts for
carbon fiber usage by structural component of the aircraft, for each
aircraft type in the 1993 fleet. Some of these types are differentiated
by production year. For example, one aircraft with over 15,000 kg. of
Carbon fiber composites will comprise 10% of the production years 1991
through 1993. Other production years of that aircraft will utilize differ-
ent amounts of carbon fiber composites in various structural components ,Of
the aircraft. The CF utilization by structural component for all the
different types of aircraft is summarized in Table 3-2.
* Although some Boeing small aircraft carry more than 150 passengers
(stretch version) they are placed in small aircraft classification.
They do not, of course, represent a significant portion of the carbon
fiber fleet as forecasted for 1993. It should be noted that the future
generation of II medium ll aircraft are larger than what many perceive
today as medium aircraft.
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TABLE 3-1
.fLEET MIX IN 1993 BASED ON
AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERS' PROJECTIONS
Number of
Total Fleet CF Aircraft
Large Aircraft 1399 1127
Medium Aircraft 780 754
Small Aircraft 560 100
Total 2739 1981
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In order to perform a Monte Carlo simulation it was necessary to
develop a probability distribution for the total amount of carbon fiber
on an aircraft involved in an accident. A separate distribution was
developed for each of the three aircraft size classifications. These
distributions were derived from the data in Table 3-2 under the follow-
ing assumptions established by NASA and the airframe companies:
• For large aircraft the 1993 fleet will be comprised
of 1/3 each of Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas aircraft.
• The 1993 medium jet fleet will be comprised of 1/2
each of Boeing and Douglas aircraft.
• The 1993 small jet fleet will be comprised entirely
of Boeing aircraft.
• The Boeing medium jet aircraft using carbon fibers
will be comprised 2/3 of 767/777 aircraft and 1/3
of 757 aircraft.
• The Boeing small jet carbon fiber fleet will be
comprised of 737 and 727 aircraft in equal proportions.
• For each manufacturer and each aircraft type the
production lots in the years from introduction of
the aircraft through 1993 will consist of equal
lot sizes.
These assumptions embodied certain simplifications; for example, we
did not consider the impact of 707 jets using carbon fibers. Based on
these assumptions, and on the data in Table 3-2, we developed probability
distributions for total carbon fiber usage in the 1993 fleet, which are
presented in Table 3-3 through 3-5. These distributions were used in the
computer program that performed the Monte Carlo simulation.
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TABLE 3-2
KILOGRAMS OF CARBON FIBER COMPOSITES
IN STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
Wing Wing Wing
Aircraft #/Year Rudder Vertical Elev~tor Horizontal Wing Trailing Leading
Wing Wing Well Floor
& Tabs Stabi 1izer &TabL Stabil izer Flaps Spoilers Ailerons Edge* Edge* Box Nacelles fairings Doors Fuselage & Beams Total
1 1981-1983 98 199 595 103 132 158 1285
2 1983-1985 9B 213 116 742 595 103 307 153 713 3045
3 1985-1990 9ll 213 116 742 595 103 410 555 613 329 153 713 4645
4 1990-1993 98 213 116 742 595 103 410 555 1394 329 15il 713 5426
5 :990~1993 98 213 115 742 595 103 410 555 10227 1394 329 158 713 15653
137 12 170 129 98 171 156 1857 362 29 114 560 3795
6 1982-1983 50 17 180 137 219 507 911 2021
7 1984-1986 50 17 180 137 219 3114 507 911 5135
8 1987-1993 191 17 238 180 137 239 219. 3114 507 179 150 911 6082
,
""0'>
9 91 91
10 1979 11 11
11 1980 45 11 127 183
12 1980-1993 11 127 139
13 1979-1980 55 55
14 1981-1993 55 93 148
15 1978-1982 155 155
16 1982 131 155 286
17 1983-1993 103 131 1002 1236
18 1982-1984 45 68 23 45 34 215
19 1985-1993 45 68 23 45 34 114 329
20 1981-1983 73 107 55 25 45 16 32 353
21 1984 73 107 55 25 45 16 32 216 569
22 1985-1993 73 107 925 55 25 45 16 32 216 1494
~- -----
Seconda!'y StrLJrture
TABLE 3.. 3
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF WEIGHT OF
CARBON FIBER COMPOSITES
Sma11 Jets-1993
Value (Kg.)
11
55
139
148
183
Probability that Total Weight
in Kg. is Less Than or Equal to Value
.034
.077
.521
.995
1.00
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TABLE 3-4
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF WEIGHT OF
CARBON FIBER COMPOSITES
Medium Jets - 1993
Va1ue (Kg.)
215
329
353
569
1494 '
3795
Probability that Total Weight
in Kq. is Less Than or Equal to V~lue
.04
.158
.237
.263
.50
1.0
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TABLE 3-5
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF WEIGHT OF
CARBON FIBER COMPOSITES
Large Jets-1993
Va1u~ (Kg.)
155
286
1236
1285
2021
3045
4645
5135
5426
6082
15,653
Probability that Total Weight
in Kg. is Less Than or Equal to Value
.031
.052
.334
.387
.443
.496
.629
.712
.795
.989
1.0
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4. PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to estimate the potential risk due to carbon fibers re-
leased from aircraft accidents, it was necessary to quantify the prob-
ability of accidents or incidents occurring at major U.S. airports. In
addition, with each accident was associated a set of conditions termed an
"accident scenario", that could affect the release of carbon fibers and
the resulting risk. These factors included the phase of operation, the
weather conditions, the occurrence of an explosive release, and the
location relative to the center of the airport. To address these con-
siderations, a comprehensive accident probability model was developed.
This chapter presents the details of this accident model.
There were two sources of data used to develop the accident proba-
bility model. The first source of data was accident reports compiled by
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which are available in
summary form on computer tapes. The second source of data was a set of
92 detailed accident reports compiled for NASA by the three major air-
frame manufacturers. These reports, which were compiled only for fire
or explosion accidents involving jet aircraft, provided data on the
~xtent of the fire or explosion, weather conditions, phase of operation,
location of accident, severity of damage, and other relevant details.
The NTSB reports were compiled for all air carrier accidents during
the period 1968 through 1976. We considered all substantial damage and
total destruction accidents or incidents in which there was a fire or
explosion. NTSB distinguishes two cases: either the accident was caused
by a fire or explosion, or a fire or explosion occurred after impact.
Data extracted from the NTSB report included information such as location
of accident, phase of operation, aircraft type, weather conditions, and
level of damage.
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A probabilistic accident model based primarily on NTSB data is pre-
sented in reference 1. The model presented in this chapter is very
similar to that earlier Phase I model. However, there are some differ-
ences based on the information provided by the airframers, and these
differences are noted as appropriate.
The most important output of the accident model was the annual fre-
quencyof accidents occurring in the United States involving jet air-
craft and a fire or explosion. In addition, several factors were
identified that either (a) influenced accident probabilities, or (b)
influenced carbon fiber dispersion. These factors included:
• Conditional probability that an accident occurs at a given
airport
• Phase of operation at the time of the accident
• Conditional probability of explosive release
• Distance of aircraft from center of runway
• Angle of runway and angle of accident site·from runway
• Size of aircraft
For each of these factors,an appropriate probabilistic model was
developed. The model for the number of accidents per year and the models
for each of the above factors are presented below. A concise summary is
also provided for each model parameter discussed.
4.2 ANNUAL ACCIDENT FREQUENCY
Based on the airframe manufacturer data base of 92 accidents there
were fifty-three fire or explosion accidents that occurred in the U.S.
in the last 14 years, which is equivalent to an average of 3.8 per year.
This 3.8 figure represents U.S. accidents only (a large number of the 92
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accidents occurred on foreign soil)t and the 14 year period represents
the time over which commercial transport fleets consisted predominantly
of jets. The 53 accidents were selected by NASA as those which could
presumably have released carbon fibers if the aircraft had been carrying
CF composite structures.
The earlier Phase I analysis t based only on NTSB reports t estimated
the expected number of U.S. jet fire or explosion accidents to be 4.5
per year (reference 1, p.63). However, under the assumption that most
cruise accidents do not occur over metropolitan areas, only about 3.8
accidents per year would be expected to take place on or near a populated
region. Inclusion of foreign carrier operations would represent a slight
increase over this figure. Hence, the computations based on the two data
sources are comparable, and for the purposes of the risk analysis it was
assumed that there were 3.8 fire accidents annually for all jet aircraft.
Given an expected number of 3.8 accidents per year in recent history,
we next projected the number of accidents that would take place in 1993.
Both reference 1 (which used the NTSB data base) and the airframe manu-
facturer data base show a slight decrease in accidents per year from
1968 through 1976. Although total operations are increasing, the total
number of accidents has remained relatively constant. Therefore, it was
assumed that 3.8 represents the expected number of fire or explosion
accidents in 1993.
Since the annual accident frequency required for the risk analysis
was for fire or explosion accidents involving jets using carbon fibers,
the 3.8 figure needed to be reduced to reflect the percentage of the jet
fleet using carbon fibers. As noted previously, the projections for
1993 indicate that 72% of U.S. jet aircraft will be using carbon fibers.
We therefore projected that the number of fire or explosion accidents
involving U.S. jets with carbon fibers would be 2.7 per year in 1993.
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Since aircraft accidents are a low-probability event, it is reasonable
to assume that the actual number of accidents in any year is Poisson
with a mean of 2.7. The data are not inconsistent with this assumption,
and the Poisson model was therefore used to develop the national risk
profile. Since the 3.8 figure was a statistical esti~ate, and was
therefore subject to uncertainty, the sensitivity analysis in the development
of the national risk profile (see Chapter 7) considered variations in
the actual mean number of accidents.
• Summary
The expected number of fire or explosion accidents involving jet
aircraft using carbon fibers and occurring on or near U.S. metropolitan
areas will be 2.7 in 1993. The actual number of accidents is assumed to
be a Poisson variable with a mean of 2.7.
4.3 LIKELIHOOD OF ACCIDENTS OCCURING AT A GIVEN AIRPORT
From an analysis of the various factors that could conceivably affect
accident rates at different airports, reference 1 concluded that the
only significant factor appropriate to a given airport was the relative
frequency of IFR and VFR weather.* Since the proportion of IFR accidents
was much higher than the proportion of IFR weather, it was concluded
that the probability that an operation results in an accident is higher
in IFR weather than in VFR weather. Based on a probabi 1i st ic mode 1, a
weather factor was developed for each airport which reflected the rela-
tive frequency of IFR weather.
To account for the weather facto~ for the projected number of opera-
tions at each city, and for the percentage of operations in 1993 that
would involve jets using carbon fibers, the following model was developed:
Pi = conditional probability that a carbon fiber jet ~ccident
with fire occurs at airporti given that such ari accident
occurs in the U.S.
*IFR = instrument flight rules, VFR = visual flight rules
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Pi = Annual carbon fiber jet fire accidents at airport i
Annual carbon fiber jet fire accidents in U.S.
= Annual number of carbon fiber jet operations at airport~~:-o:-r-="...,...,...~-::-:,.,..,..,..-=-=-.....,,~.,..,.-""";:'~~.,...,..,.,~.,.--.--rr__-!...-'-- X Wl'Total annual carbon flber jet operations inO.S.
where
Wi = Ratio rate of fire accident rate at airport i to the overall
fire accident rate for the U.S.
However, Wi is equivalent to the weather factor which adjusts
accident rates to account for airport differences. There is an implicit
assumption in this analysis, of course, that accident rates for jet
aircraft using carbon fibers is the same as the accident rate for all
jet aircraft. The equation for the weather factor, as derived in .
reference 1, is
Wi = 4.52 x P(IFR) + .58 x P(VFR) (4.1)
The weather factors computed in Phase I ranged from .65 for Miami to
1.17 for Los Angeles and are presented in Table 4-1.
In estimating these factors, reference 1 noted that the proportion
of non-static fire accidents in the NTSB data base occurring in IFR
weather was 34 out of 70. The airframe manufacturers' data base for
domestic accidents contained 53 accidents, of which 23 occurred in IFR
weather. Since the difference in these proportions was judged not to be
significant, equation(4.1)was used to compute the relative likelihoods
of an accident occurring at any of the 26 large hub airports.
The overall model for incidence of accidents also required the
estimated number of operations taking place in 1993 involving jet air-
craft using carbon fiber composites at each airport. In order to develop
these estimates for the 26 hub airports, it was necessary to forecast
the operations mix at each airport and to adjust these to reflect the
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TABLE 4-1
COMPUTATIONS FOR CONDITIONAL ACCIDENT PROBAB,ILITIES
OF 26 HUB AIRPORTS
Estimated 1993 Weather CF Conditional
City Jet Operations Factor Adjustment Probabi 1ity
Atlanta 433,434 1.09 0.54312 0.077106
Boston 171 ,897 1.06 0.62757 (l.O34362
Chicago 599,339 1.04 0.71862 0.1346
Cleveland 116,618 1.05 0.60523 0.02227
Da Has 288,369 1.00 0.7531 0.065259
Denver 201,927 .78 0.71074 0.033639
Detroit 142,166 1.09 0.74691 0.03478
Honolulu 100,788 .80 0.58995 0.014294
Houston 129,637 1.00 0.82543 0.032155
Kansas City 96,976 .99 0.81053 0.023384
Kennedy 289,275 1.05 0.82448 0.075253
Laguardia 213,724 1.05 0.50437 0.034012
Las Vegas 108,891 .79 0.77442 0.020019
Los Angeles 311,660 1. 17 0.77792 0.08524
Miami 249,330 .65 0.68352 0.033287
Mi nneapo1is 124,308 .95 0.64877 0.023023
Newark 116,208 1.04 0.57253 0.020793
New Orleans 100,806 .95 0.60615 0.017443
Ph il ade 1ph i a 138,520 1.04 0.59808 0.025891
Phoenix 91,179 .79 0.63926 0.013837
Pittsburgh 176,750 1.12 0.5698 0.033895
San Francisco 219,634 .89 0.49968 0.029351
Seatt l.e 119,165 .95 0.74013 0.025178
St. Louis 165,764 .99 0.79583 0.039245
Tampa 114,088 .80 0.73209 0.020079
Washington 189,295 .87 0.63863 0.031604
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proportion of operations in each size class involving jets carrying
carbon fibers. The methodology for developing these forecasts is dis-
cussed below in Section 4.7. The estimated percentage of operations in
each size class for each city was multiplied by the percentage of the
total U.S. fleet for each size category using carbon fibers in 1993.
The result was a carbon fiber adjustment factor to convert total jet
operations into carbon fiber jet operations. Estimated 1993 operations
were assumed to be proportional to present operations and were derived
from the data in Reference 1. The resulting conditional probabilities
are listed in Table 4-1.
• Summary
The conditional probability that a U.S. fire accident involving a
carbon fiber-carrying jet occurs at a given airport in 1993 is assumed
to be proportional to the weather factor and the estimated number of op-
erations in 1993 involving jet aircraft using carbon fibers. The weather
factor is given by equation (4.1) and the computed conditional probabilities
for the 26 hub airports are presented in Table 4-1.
4.4 PHASE OF OPERATION
The data on phase of operation from the two data sources, NTSB ~nd
the airframe companies, are presented in Table 4-2. Although the air-
frame manufacturers' data base shows a decrease in the conditional prob-
ability that an accident is a take-off accident, the difference is not
extremely large. Therefore, the reference 1 data were used as the basis
of the conditional probability calculations. As the substantial damage
and total destruction categorizations were not used explicitly in
estimating any of the release conditions, this distinction was not con-
sidered. In addition, since most cruise accidents would occur over
unpopulated areas, attention was restricted to the other three phases of
operation.
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TABLE 4-2
PHASE OF OPERATION DATA
Phase
Cruise
Take-Off
Landing
Static or
Taxi
Data Source
Reference 1 Reference 1 Air Frame
Total Destruction Accidents All Accidents Manufacturers
9 13 N/A *
13 20 32
31 37 48
3 11 8
* The airframe manufacturers classified some accidents as take-off
or landing that NTSB might classify as cruise. These include accidents
occurring within an airport area but at a distance greater than 10 km.
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• Summary
The conditional probabilities for the three on or near airport
phases were assumed to be
Take-Off
Landing
Static or Taxi
4.5 LIKELIHOOD OF AN EXPLOSIVE RELEASE
.294
.544
.162
The data base of the airframe manufacturers provided some useful
information on the incidence of explosive release accidents. In the
Phase I analysis (r'eference 1) there were no data available for these
types of releases, and the probability that the release was of the ex-
plosive mode was estimated at between between 5% and 25% depending on
the phase and damage category. The overall average was 8%. In the
airframe manaufacturer's data base there were 22 out of a total of 92
accidents that involved explosions. 14 of the 92 explosions were ex-
plosions following fire. However, of these 14 it was judged that not
all could cause an explosive carbon fiber release. It was assumed that
in order for an explosive type of release to occur that the explosion
would have to follow the fire by at least 3 minutes or that there would
have to be a long burn with multiple explosions. Of the ~2 fire accidents
examined,only 4 fires were found to meet these criteria, with one
additional one as a possibility. Thus the resulting probability estimate
for an explosive type of release was 5 out of 92 or 5.4%.
The fire and explosion type of release was also sub-classified into
two additional categories. In one of these categories the ADL explosive
release dispersion model was utilized, which assumes an instantaneous
release of fibers. In the second category the usual fire-plume dis-
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persian model was used, but the amount released was set at the value
used for the explosive type releases, which represents an increase
over the standard plume release (See Chapter 5). The conditional proba-
bility of each of these two categories of releases was estimated to be
50% each, to account for the different possible CF dispersion scenarios
in the aftermath of an explosion.
In the Phase I analysis, it was hypothesized that explosive releases
would be more likely in take-off accidents occuring on the runway (or
within 0.6 km. of the edge of the runway) and in static accidents.
These assumptions were also used in the present accident model. The
assumed probabilities for explosive type releases were 10% for take-off
acCidents occuring within 0.6 km. of the edge of the runway and 6% for
static accidents. For all other types of accidents the probability of
an explosive release was estimated to be 3%. The overall probability,
averaged over all accidents, was 5.4%.
• Summary
The fire/explosion release mode was split equally between an in-
stantaneous explosive release and a plume release involving a larger
amount of carbon fibers than the fire-only case. The aggregate proba-
. bilities of these two types of releases combined were:
• 10% for accidents taking place within 0.6 km.from
the edge of the runway.
• 6% for static accidents
• 3% for other accidents
• 5.4% overall
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4.6 ACCIDENT LOCATION PARAMETERS
4.6.1 Distance From The Center of Runway
For each of the 26 large hub airports a centroid was located at the
approximate center of all of the runways, and a probability distribution
was developed to specify the location of the accident relative to this
centroid. For static or taxi accidents, the location was assumed to be
near the terminal area, and a distance value was measured from airport
maps. For take-off and landing accidents the probability distribution
developed in Phase I was used to detemine the distance from the edge of
the runway. This probability distribution (which aggregated the total
destruction and substantial damage cases) is presented below in the
summary. If the distance value was greater than zero an additional 1.6
km. was added to reflect the distance from the edge of the runway to the
center of the runway. If the distance value was zero the accident was
assumed to occur at the center of the runway.
This model for distance from the edge of the runway was statistically
consistent with the airframe manufacturers' data base, as shown in the
comparison presented in Table 4-3. In the model calculations 13 out of
81 cruise accidents were assumed to take place at distances greater than
10 kilometers from the airport, and all static and taxi accidents were
assumed to take place within the terminal area.
• Summary
Static and taxi accidents were assumed to occur in the terminal area
and the appropriate distances were measured from airport maps. Take-off
and landing accidents occurred at either the center of the runway or at
a positive distance from the edge of the runway whose probability dis-
tribution was as follows:
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TABLE 4-3
DISTANCE FROM EDGE OF RUNWAY COMPUTED BY MODEL COMPARED
WITH AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERS' DATA BASE
On Ground
< 1 km
< 10 km
Model
(NTSB Accidents)
61%
68%
83%
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Airframe Manufacturers'
Data Base
(60 Domestic Accidents)
63%
67%
82%
.16 e-· 43R + .042 e-· 94R (Take-offs)
P(Distance > R) =
.38 e-· 43R + .02 e-· 94R
4.6.2 Angle of Accident Site From Runway
(Landings)
The second aspect of the probabilistic location model for aircraft
accidents was the angle of the accident from the airport centroid. The
angle of the accident consisted of the sum of two variables: the orien-
tation of the runway and the angle of the accident relative to the run-
way. The probability distribution of the angle from the runway was
based on the model in reference 1. The correlation coefficient between
this angle and the distance from the edge of the runway was also used.
This distribution is presented below in the summary.
The orientation of the runway was a city-dependent variable. Its
distribution was based upon each city·s runway usage frequencies and
adjusted to account for the fact that approximately half of lqnding
accidents are undershoots and half are overshoots. Runway usage fre-
quencies were obtained from references 2 and 3. For eight cities we
could not obtain usage frequencies,and for these cities a uniform dis-
tribution of angles was assumed based upon the known runway orientations.
These distributions are presented in reference 1.
• Summary
The angle of the accident was the sum of the angle from the runway
and the runway orientation. The probability distribution of the angle
from the runway was assumed to be
P(Ang1e > a) = • 78e - a/3 . 7
with -20% correlation with distance from edge of runway
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Orientation of the runway was based on runway usage frequencies
where available, and on a uniform distribution of runway locations where
unavail ab le.
4.7 SIZE OF AIRCRAFT
For each of the 26 hub airports we assumed that the probability of
an accident involving an aircraft of a given size is proportional to
the estimated percentage of 1993 operations involving jets using carbon
fibers for the given aircraft size. According to the airframe manufac-
turers' predictions, the overall 1993 fleet mix for jets using carbon
fibers will be 5%, 38% and 57%, for small, medium, and large jets,
respectively. According to the analysis in reference 1, the existing
U.S. jet fleet mix is 25%, 60%, and 15% for small, medium, and large
aircraft, respectively.* The relationship between the 1993 forecasts
for carbon fiber aircraft fleet mix and the present fleet mix for all
jet aircraft represents a mathematical transformation that we applied to
each airport's present operations mix in order to forecast the oper-
ations mix at airports in 1993. These forecasts are presented in Table
4-4.
As noted in Section 4.3,for a given airport it was also necessary to
forecast operations mixes for all jet aircraft in 1993 for the 26 air-
ports. This was performed by an analogous mathematical transformation
using the total of the fleet mix for 1993.
• Summary
The aircraft size distribution was assumed to be equal to the fore-
cast 1993 mix of operations for jet aircraft carrying carbon fibers.
These forecasts are presented in Table 4-4.
* The classification system in reference 1 classes Boeing 727 and
707 as medium size while the airframe manufacturers classify these
craft as small. This does not affect the transformation procedure.
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TABLE 4-4
FORECASTED OPERATIONS MIX FOR JETS USING CARBON FIBERS (1993)
Percentage of Aircraft
Airport Sma 11 Medium Large
Atlanta 15.7 42.3 42.0
Boston 10.0 41.5 48.5
Chicago 5.6 46.0 48.4
Cl eve1and 12.2 59.5 28.3
Da 11 as -Ft. Worth 5.2 68.2 26.6
Denver 6.4 55.4 38.2
Detroit 4.7 52.4 42.9
Honolulu 10.8 9.5 79.7
Houston 0.9 33.7 65.5
JFK 1.0 25. 1 73.9
Kansas City 3.6 89.8 6.5
Las Vegas 19.1 45.8 35.1
Los Angeles 2.7 33.2 64.1
Miami 2.9 40.2 56.9
Minneapolis 7.3 47.4 45.3
Newark 9.3 51.8 38.9
New Orleans 14. 1 54.1 31.8
LaGuardia 12.3 62.8 24.9
Philadelphia 12.2 50.0 37.9
Phoenix 10.2 59.7 30.1
Pittsburgh 15.2 73.2 11.6
St. Louis 20.5 66.3 13.2
San Franc i sco 4.4 40.2 55.4
Seattle-Tacoma 2.9 54. 1 43.0
Tampa 5.5 56.2 38.4
Washington-National 11.6 88.4 0.0
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4.8 Model Uncertainties
The overall accident model is based on statistical analysis of a
large number of accidents, and consequently, some of the estimates are
subject to statistical uncertainty. A discussion of the extent and the
nature of this uncertainty is presented in reference 1. Most of the
parameters of the accident model will not have a great impact on the
risk analysis with the possible exception of the annual accident rate.
As noted in Reference 1, 81 fire and explosion accidents occurred during
the nine year period that was the basis of the analysis. Assuming that
the actual number of accidents during the period was a Poisson random
variable, then a 95% confidence bound for the true expected number of
accidents during the period is 65 to 101. Similarly the 53 accidents in the
airframer data base that occurred during the last 14 years correspond to
confidence bounds of 40 to 69. The latter bounds range from 75% to 130%
of the observed number of accidents. As these bounds represent a moder-
ate departure from the observed accident rate, the levels of 75% and
130% were used as the basis of a sensitivity analysis in the development
of the national risk profile. (See Chapter 7).
4.9 REFERENCE
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5. CARBON FIBER RELEASE CONDITIONS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the methodology and data sources analyzed to
determine the carbon fiber release scenarios for aircraft accidents. The
scenarios consisted of a set of probability distributions for each of
the variables, other than those described in Chapter 4, that were judged
to have impact on carbon fiber release and dispersion in the aftermath
of an aircraft fire. The set of probability distributions for all of
the variables considered was used as input to the MonteCarln simulation
model described in Chapter 7.
In a general sense a release scenario consisted of all the vari~bles
that could possibly affect dispersion. The focus of this chapter is on
those variables that were not incorporated within the accident model.
These variables consisted of two distinct types. The first type was the
set of weather variables that could impact carbon fiber dispersion.
These included:
• Wind Direction
• Wind Velocity
• Pasquill Stability Class
• Ambient Temperature
The second type consisted of a set of variables relating to the
nature and intensity of the accident. The distributions for these vari-
ables were derived primarily from the data base of 92 accidents analyzed
by the airframe manufacturers. These distributions were used as input
to the dispersion model which estimatated carbon fiber exposures following
a release incident. The relevant variables were:
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• Mass of carbon fibers released
• Amount of fuel burned
• Duration of the fire
There were a number of complexities involved in analyzing the carbon
fiber release conditions. For example, the total mass of carbon fibers
released depends on the amount carried on the plane, the amount involved
in the fire, and the percentage that is actually released. To develop
an appropriate model, we identified the following set of underlying
variables, and wherever possible incorporated correlations among them.
• Total mass of carbon fiber composites on the aircraft
• Percentage of carbon fiber composites involved in
the fire .
•' Percentage of involved fibers that were released
• Amount of fuel carried on the aircraft
• Percentage of fuel consumed in the fire
• Duration of the fire
These variables together comprise the second set of release condition
variables which we denoted as accident variables. The first variable
above, mass of carbon fiber composites carried on the aircraft, is des-
cribed in Chapter 3. The modelling assumptions for the other variables
are described in this chapter.
The different release scenarios were developed under the explicit
assumption that an accident had occurred. The simulation model actually
simulated individual accidents and hence provided a conditional distri'-
bution of losses given an accident. The conditional distribution was
then combined with the probability of an accident in order to develop
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unconditional distributions of losses. Thus, it should be recognized
that release variables are conditional on an accident and that all the
variables presented in this chapter are conditional variables.
The remalnlng two sections of this chapter desribed the modelling
assumptions for each of the two types of variables described above.
Section 5.2 describes the development of models for the four weather
variables, and Section 5.3 describes the modelling of the other five
accident variables, excluding the mass of carbon fibers on aircraft.
5.2 WEATHER VARIABLES
The four weather variables used in the simulation model included
wind velocity, wind direction, temperature, and Pasquill stability class.
The wind velocity, stability class and temperature were all direct inputs
to the dispersion model, while the wind direction was used to locate the
carbon fiber cloud on the geographic coordinate system developed for
each of the 26 major hub airports. Actual distributions were drawn from
reference 1 which compiled the data necessary for each of the distribu-
tions from airport climatological surveys and for the case of tempera-
ture, from the U.S. Statistical Abstracts. Wind velocity, wind direction,
and temperature, of course, have direct numerical measures. Stabi'lity
class could take on six possible values ranging from stable to neutral
to unstable. In addition, to reflect the actual correlation between
wind speed and stability class, a separate wind speed distribution was
developed for each of the six stability classes and' each of the 26 large
hub cities.
5.3 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ACCIDENT VARIABLES
5.3.1 Model Description
In the development of a probabilistic model for the various carbon
fiber release conditions, a great deal of emphasis was placed on two
sources of recently obtained historical and experimental data. An anal-
ysis of these data sources has led to modifications of Phase I models of
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accidental release conditions. The two sources of data consist of the
92-accident data base compiled by the airframe manufacturers and some
recent experimental findings [2] on the possible amount of carbon fibers
released in an accident. The 92-accident data base included t in addition
to accident data such as the location and weather conditions t the duration
of the burnt the amount or percentage of fuel burned t and the percent of
structure consumed for each major component for the aircraft. These
latter categories of data are generally not available in the standard
NTSB accident reports.
In reviewing these data t one of our major conclusions was that even
though aircraft may be carrying over 15 tOOO kilograms of carbon fiber
composites t the amount of carbon fibers that could be released in a fire
is significantly less. This is partly because not all of the carbon
fibers can be released as single fibers in a burnt and partly because
the entire aircraft structure will not necessarily be involved in the
fire. These two considerations are reflected in two accident variables,
namely the percent of carbon fibers released and the percent of compo-
sites involved in the fire.
To incorporate all of the variables within a model that could be
used directly in dispersion calculations, the following equatio~s,were
used.
Mass of Fibers Released = (Mass of Composite on Aircraft) x 70%
. x (Percent of Composite Involved)
x (Percent of Involved Fibers Released)
Fuel Burned (Fuel on Aircraft) x (Percent of Fuel Burned)
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The amount of composite on the aircraft is based on the probability
distribution described in Chapter 3, and this is multiplied by 70% to
reflect the fraction of composite mass that consists of carbon fibers.
The percent of involved fibers released is based on experimental findings
and the percent of composites involved is based on the.92 accidentd~ta'
base. The amount of fuel on the aircraft is determined by the phase of
operation and size of the aircraft. The percent of fuel burned and the
third major release variable, the duration of burn, were based on the
92-accident compilation. It should also be noted that correlations were
computed for the following three variables: percent of composite involved,
percent of fuel burned, and duration of burn. These correlations were
used in the Monte Carlo simulation for the purposes of generating release
scenarios. As a general rule, the greater the amount of fuel burned,
the longer the duration of the burn and the greater the percent of
carbon fiber involvement.
The analyses of each of these variables, with the exception of t~e
mass of composite carried by the aircraft, are described below.
5.3.2 Percent of Involved Fibers Rele~s.ed
Recent experimental findings [2] indicate that the percent of fibers
involved in a fire that are released as single fibers is much lower than
assumed in previous research. NASA estimates that not more than 1% of
the fibers would be released in most fire plumes and that not more than
2.5% would be released in the fire and explosion scenarios. These are
conservative estimates based on interpretation of multiple experiments
conducted by NASA as well as other groups.
Consequently, as input to the simulation model, the following dis-
tribution was used to determine the percent of involved fibers that are
released in an accident. In 94.6% of the cases, it was assumed that a
fire plume would occur with a release of 1% of the mass of carbon fibers
~nvolved in the accident. In the other 5.4% of the cases a fire and
explosion would occur resulting in a 2.5% release. The derivation of
the 5.4% figure was also based on the 92 accident data base, and is
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described in Chapter 4. The cases corresponding to the larger release
percentage were split into two types. In one type, the explosive release
was assumed to cause an instantaneous release of fibers, while in the
other type a continuous-release fire plume was assumed with an increase in
the total amount of fibers released from 1% to 2.5%.
5.3.3 Percent Of Composite Involved
To analyze the percent of composite involved we examined the 92
accident data base which provided information on percent of structures
involved in a fire accident. For each of the 92 accidents the percent
involved in the fire was estimated for each of the i5 major components
of the aircraft. In other words, a random sample was provided consisting
of 92 events. Associated with each of these 92 events was a vector of
18 values, each representing the percent of the corresponding structure
that was involved in the fire.
We then assumed that if a given component of an aircraft contained a
certain mass of carbon fibers, that the CF mass would be involved in the
fire to the same degree that the structure was involved in the fire.
For example, if the nacelles were characterized by 50% involvement in
the fire then any mass of carbon fibers in the nacelles would be 50%
involved. Thus, a given distribution of carbon fiber mass by component
of the aircraft could be combined with each of the 92 vectors describing
structural involvement to yield a set of 92 values for the total amount
of carbon fibers involved in the accidents. Dividing by the total mass
of carbon fibers on the plane yielded a set of 92 percentages of carbon
fiber mass involved.
A flow chart for the above procedure is presented in Figure 5.1. By
using the distribution of mass by component of the aircraft for several
of the major carbon fiber aircraft in 1993, we developed a probability
distribution of the percent of carbon fiber involved in a fire.
That is, we assumed that a certain mix of 1993 aircraft would be involved
in the 92 historical accidents that were analyzed by the airframe manufacturers,
and we calculated the percentaqes of carbon fibers involved based on
this assumed mix.
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FIGURE 5-1
POTENTIAL CF INVOLVEMENT IN AIR CARRIER FIRES:
ANALYSIS BY AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS
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The distributions were developed separately for small, medium, and
large aircraft; the results are presented in Tables 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3.
The range of involvement varies from a per~erit, reflecting a fire which
did not damage any of the structure containing carbon fibers, to 100
percent involvement, in which all portions of the aircraft containing
carbon fiber composites were completely involved in the fire. Our median
estimate of carbon fiber involvement was 54% for small jets~ 32% for
medium jets, and 34% for large jets. This variation is due largely to
the different levels of carbon fiber usage that are anticipated in dif-
ferent aircraft size classes.
5.3.4 Fuel on Aircraft
The amount of fuel that is carried by an aircraft depends directly
on two factors: the size of the aircraft and the phase of operation.
Although there is some probabilistic variation in the amount of fuel on
board at any time, we concluded that a deterministic function of the
aircraft size and phase of operation would account for most of the actual
variation observed in practice. The estimates that we used are presented
in Table 5-4. These estimates were based on
• Fuel capacities of existing aircraft
• Anticipated fuel capacities of the new generation of jet
aircraft, and
• Data from the 92 accident data base on amount of fuel on board
as a function of phase.
It was conservatively assumed that in the take-off and in the static
or taxi phase the aircraft would be fully loaded with fuel, ~hereas on
landing the amount of fuel on board would be only a small portion of the
capacity. The exact amounts are presented tn Table 5-4.
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Value
o
5
25
40
45
50
70
85
100
TABLE 5-1
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR PERCENT
OF CF CONSUMED - SMALL JETS
Probability That Percent
is Less Than or Equal to Value
0.10
0.20
0.27
0.40
0.41
0.45
0.68
0.90
1.0
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Value
o
5
15
35
40
45
65
90
100
TABLE 5~2
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR PERCENT
OF CF CONSUMED - MEDIUM JETS
Probability That Percent
;s Less Than or Equal to Value
.0
.15
.32
.55
.62
.64
.85
.99
1.00
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TABLE 5-3
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR PERCENT
OF CFCONSUMED - LARGE JETS
Value
o
5
15
20
40
45
75
80
100
56
Probability that Percent
is Less Than or Equal to Value
.01
. 17
.31
.34
.56
.59
.89
.93
1.00
TABLE 5-4
ASSUMED VALUES FOR TOTAL FUEL ON AIRCRAFT (Liters)
Small Jets
Medium Jets
Large Jets
Take-off, Static or Taxi
17,000
40,000
150,000
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Landing
5,100
12,000
25,000
5.3.5 Percent of Fuel Burned
The percent of fuel burned was drawn directly from the 92 accident
data base by dividing the amount of fuel burned by the total amount of
fuel on board, for those cases in which both entries were recorded. The
resulting probability distribution is presented in Table 5-5. A rela-
tively uniform distribution of percent of fuel burned was observed.
However, this variable was correlated with both the percent of composite
involved and the duration of the fire, as might be expected.
5.3.6 Duration of Fire
The duration of the fire was also computed directly from the 92 acci-
dent data base. It was recognized, however, that there would be some diffi-
culty in interpreting the length of time recorded on the accident record.
In most cases, it was assumed that the entire duration would be recorded,
including a peak burn period followed by a gradual lessening of the
fire intensity. On the other hand, the dispersion model used to determine
CF exposure assumed a uniform burning rate during the burn period. Thus,
using the burn period as recorded might result in an underestimate of
the burn rate during the period when most of the carbon fiber structure
is consumed. To address this issue we adjusted the distribution by
dividing the recorded burn period by two, limiting the burn period to a
maximum of 35 minutes and assuming that the burn period would be at
least as long as 2 minutes. The resulting distribution is presented in
Table 5-6.
5.4 CORRELATIONS AMONG ACCIDENT VARIABLES
Because of their mutual dependence, we measured correlations among
the following three variables:
• Duration of fire
• Percent of fuel burned
• The percent of carbon fiber composites involved
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TABLE 5-5
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR PERCENT OF FUEL BURNED
Val ue
1
5
35
50
70
75
80
85
100
59
Probability That Percent
is Less Than or Equal to Value
. 15
.22
.33
.46
.54
.60
.84
.94
1.0
TABLE 5-6
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR TIME OF BURN
Value
2
5
10
15
25
30
35
60
Probability That Time in
Minutes is Less Than or Equal to Value
0.0
0.28
0.44
0.63
0.67
0.77
1.0
As mentioned earlie~, the latter was calculated for each of the 92
accidents by estimating the distribution of carbon fiber composites by
structural component for the major aircraft in the 1993 fleet. The
resulting correlation coefficients were 76% between percent of composite
involved and percent of fuel burned, 44% percent between percent of
composite involved and duration of burn, and 47% between percent of fuel
burned and duration of burn. These correlation factors were then used
in the Monte Carlo simulation to reflect the observed relationship among
the three variables.
5.5 DISPERSION ANALYSIS
The two dispersion models corresponding to the two accident and
carbon fiber release scenarios are discussed in reference 1 of
Chapter 2. In the fire and explosion case, we considered only those
accidents in which there was a delayed explosion preceded by a period of
burn during which the epoxy or resin surrounding the fibers would be
burned away. This would expose the carbon fibers to an agitation by the
force of the conflagration and thus would hypothetically result in a
larger number of single fibers released. This scenario was modelled as
an instantaneous release in the form of a cloud at a height of 10 meters
above the site of the accident. In the fire plume model, rather than
having an instantaneous release we assumed a continuous release of fibers
over the period that the aircraft burns. The carbon fiber plume would
rise until it met the inversion layer and then would be tilted or re-
flected back toward the ground. The direction and velocity of the wind
determined the exposure contours over which carbon fibers would be de-
posited.
In the current Phase II analysis we have improved the continuous
plume dispersion model and retained the same instantaneous release model
as utilized in Phase I of work. The continuous plume dispersion model
was improved as follows:
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• As the buoyant fire plume rises to its maximum vertical
ceiling height the plume half-width,as measured by the
distance from the plume center to the velocity contour equal
to lie of the centerline velocity, is calculated.
• The subsequent wind driven tilted plume is then assumed to
originate at a virtual point source displaced ten half-widths
upwind of the bouyant fire plume centerline at the ceiling
hei ght.
The net effect of this model improvement is to take account of the
finite starting boundary conditions of the tilted plume portion of the
model. This in turn displaces the high exposure footprints at ground
level, bringing them closer to the fire source. The actual area of
various exposure footprints is not appreciably altered.
5.6 REFERENCES
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6. ECONOMIC LOSS ANALYSIS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
An important component of the risk assessment methodology was the
estimation of economic losses resulting from CF releases in the after-
math of aircraft fires. This was accomplished by a computer subroutine
which was called during each iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation of
air carrier accidents. After the accident conditions were randomly
drawn, a dispersion model was used to estimate CF exposures in the area
surrounding the release location. The economic subroutine then util-
ized business and demographic data for the corresponding large hub air~
port, along with estimates of equipment vulnerability and failure costs,
to compute the expected economic losses resulting from the given expo~
sure distribution. The role of this subroutine within the overall
methodology is illustrated in Figure 7-1.
The present economic loss analysis represents an enhancement of
the original approach used in Phase I of the carbon fiber risk assess-
ment.* As a result of detailed site visits to various types of facili-
ties, including site visits performed by Bionetics, a more detailed and
accurate description of potential failure modes and consequences was
developed. The facility categories originally selected were reconsid-
ered, with some being deleted and new ones being added. In addition,
more recent test results allowed NASA to develop improved estimates of
equipment vulnerability, which were incorporated into the facility des-
criptions. The calculation of airborne exposure transfer functions
(AETF), which characterize building penetration properties of carbon
fibers, was also revised as a result of more recent data and detailed
site visits.
*See reference in Chapter 2.
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This chapter presents a summary of the facility categories consid-
ered, the corresponding evaluations of potential loss, and the methods
used to estimate aggregate economic losses resulting from a simulated
CF release. A complete tabulation of the data utilized'in the economic
subroutine may be found in Appendix A. These data were also adapted
for use in two parallel risk assessments* dealing with releases from
accidental fires in general aviation aircraft and motor vehicles.
6.2 OBJ ECn VES
The objectives of the Phase II estimation of economic losses were
to:
• visit representative commercial, industrial, and service organ-
izations and survey the types of equipment in operation, inspect
the air conditioning and ventilation systems in use, make esti-
mates of the repair costs associated with failures of these
equipment, and estimate the business disruption costs that would
be associated with identifiable failures of each type of equip-
ment.
• For various facil ity types, estimate the transfer functions for
determining the internal carbon fiber exposure.
• With the assistance of NASA, develop appropriate vulnerability
estimates for different categories of ~quipment.
• Summarize the on-site equipment, the building transfer func~
tions, and the repair and business disruption costs for the
facilities visited during Phase II.
• Revise the equipment repair costs and facility disruption costs
for those additional categories of facilities that were visited
in Phase I but not visited in Phase II.
* See references 2 and .3. in Chapter 2.
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• Incorporate the four site visits performed by Bionetics Corpo-
ration*for purposes of comparison and supplementing of the data
base.
• From the above findings, prepare quantitative estimates of
potential losses for incorporation into the risk analysis com-
puter model.
6.3 MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions were used to permit the systematic
assessment of economic losses over a wide range of facility categories:
• We assumed that equipment failure would cause losses associated
with the most critical function that the equipment performed in
the operation of the facility. The only exception was damage
to inventory.
• We assumed that all firms or organizations within an industry
had the same financial operating characteristics and revenues,
using an industry average for each metropolitan area bein,g con-
sidered.
• If several pieces of identical equipment operated simultane-
ously, failures were assumed to be independent. Thus, relative
locations of equipment did not affect their individual failure
probabil i ti es.
• Economics were assessed by categories on the basis of statisti-
cal expectation, i.e., dollar loss estimates were assigned to
the expected number of failures within an industry-equipment
category.
• Failures were assumed to occur within a short period of time
after the CF release, so that the phenomenon of post-exposure
* See reference 2 in Chapter 5.
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vulnerability due to re-entrained fibers was not explicitly
considered .
• Within each industry, facilities were assumed to be identically
equipped for each city, and to have identical building transfer
functions. In certain cases, facilities were divided into sev-
eral classes of transfer function characteristics .
• Only "primary" costs to the facility in which equipment failure
occurred were included. Secondary impacts, such as disruptions
in the operations of firms relying on a service company which
experiences a shutdown, were not considered.
These assumptions make it feasible to estimate economic losses in
any major metropolitan area as a function of exposure to carbon fibers.
The use of expectations and averages precludes extreme values of loss
from being incorporated into the risk profile. However, the other eco-
nomic loss assumptions were made conservative in an effort to ensure
that potentially high risks were not ignored in the aggregate.
6.4 FIELD INVESTIGATIONS
6.4.1 Identification of Facility Categories
Potentially vulnerable facilities were considered to be any estab-
lishments or major pieces of equipment (such as aircraft) which house
or utilize electronic equipment that have been shown to be susceptible
to damage from carbon fibers. Since most large and medium hub airports
are located in close proximity to heavily populated areas, a signifi-
cant number of potentially vulnerable facilities fall well within the
potential range of a carbon fiber cloud. Moreover, due to the wide-
spread use of electronics, a large number of commercial and industrial
business types had to be included in the economic analysis. Thus it
was necessary to identify a finite set of important facility categories
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for which field investigations had to be conducted in order to estimate
possible economic losses.
During the Phase I risk assessment, most of the pertinent industry
categories had already been identified, and a number of field visits had
been conducted. These previous investigations formed a basis for the
Phase II economic analysis. In a few cases facility categories were
dropped from consideration because the equipment in question appeared to
be essentially invulnerable; in other cases new categories were added
due to a recognition of their potential vulnerability. The final set of
facility categories identified for economic analysis are shown in
Table 6-1. Where possible, individual facility categories are identi-
fied by three and four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes. Those categories that were visited in Phase II are distinguished
from those which were dealt with by updating the information gathered
during the Phase I field visits. The four facilities visited by the
Bionetics Corporation, for which detailed site visit reports are avail-
able, were also included in the overall analysis.
6.4.2 Detailed Site Visits
,
To gather information for the economic analysis, a number of site
visits were arranged during which engineering personnel visited repre-
sentative industrial, commercial, and public facilities that might be
expected to be affected by carbon fiber infestation in the event of an
accident at a major airport. Field investigations were made at each of
the sites identified in Table 6-1, under Phase II. For each field
visit, the facility was briefly described, details were obtained about
air conditioning and ventilation systems ,in each area where potentially
vulnerable equipment was found, and the equipment were identified that
resided .in each area. Information was obtained on how individual equip-
ment repairs were made (in-house, outside contract, or combinations
thereof). Information was also obtained to assist in the estimation of
costs of facility disruption in the event that critical pieces of equip-
ment failed. As noted in Table 6-1, all the necessary vulnerability and
cost data for aircrafts at airports were obtained directly from the air-
frame manufacturers.
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TABLE 6-1
FACILITY CATEGORIES FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Site Visits
SIC No. Phase I Phase II Bionetics Corp.
l. Households
2. Fire and Police
A. Large Metropolitan Police Central 9221 I
B. Large Metropolitan Fire Central 9224 I
C. Small Police Headquarters 9221 I
D. Small Fire Headquarters 9224 I
3. Post Office (Major Sorting Center)
O"l
CX> 4. Subway, Railroad
A. Subway 401 I
B. Railroad 401 I
5. Manufacture of Electronics and Mechanical Eqpt. 3714 I
6. General Manufacturers
A. Organic Fibers, noncellulosic 2824 I
B. Electronic Equipment, television receivers 3651 "I
C. Toilet preparation 2844 I
7. Telephone Services
A. Large Switching Center 481 I
B. Small Switching Center 481 I
Table 6-1 Continued
Site Visits
SIC No. Phase I Phase II Bionetics Corp.
8. Radio/TV 483 I
9. El ec tri c Uti 1ity 491 I
10. General Merchandise
A. Main Store 531 I
B. Branch Store 531 I
C. Retai 1 Grocer 541
ll. Finance and Insurance
A. Brokerage house 621
O"l B. Computer services 737 I
~
12. R&D, Universities I
13. Hospital s I
14. Automotive Assembly
A. Automotive Assembly
B. Small Truck I
15. Aviation
A. Ai rcraft* I
B. Control Tower I
C. Passenger Terminal I
D. ASR Field Radar I
E. LOC at Airport I
F. VOR at Airport I
*Inputs from airframe manufacturers
A capsule summary of the findings for each facility category is
given in Appendix B.
6.4.3 Summary of Findings From Establishments Visited
Below are summarized what we considered to be the most important
findings from the Phase II visits to different establishments:
• All of the electronic equipment and control equipment identi-
fied in the establishments visited could experience failures.
Each establishment has developed procedures to follow in the
event of equipment failures. In the large organizations, main-
tenance personnel are generally available to either make repairs
on the spot, or else to remove a faulty piece of equipment and
replace it with a spare. The faulty equipment would then be
taken to an on-site repair shop and repaired by:a company
repair person, held for the repair person's next visit, or
shipped out for repair. The inventory of spare equipment is
dependent on the failure rate experience. For many organiza-
tions, repair and maintenance contracts are established on spe-
cialized electronic equipment such as computers, typewriters,
communications, radios, point-of-sale terminals, and other
equipment that may require servlclng. Most of these contracts
call for prompt service at any time of the day.
• Those organizations operating critical pieces of equipment
whose failure would result in substantial loss of service, pro-
duction, or revenue, give very special attention to equipment
reliability. In some organizations, backup equipment is avail-
able on standby or, special precautions are taken for protecting
the equipment from the hazards of environment. Most of the
large computer facilities are housed in specially controlled
rooms within air conditioned buildings. These rooms are partic-
ularly invulnerable to carbon fiber penetration.
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• Some equipment, if properly maintained with the covers and
access doors closed, is simply invulnerable. It was found that
modern radio transceivers and much in-plant electrical switch
gear are enclosed in tightly fitting cabinets that effectively
reduce the transfer functi on between one and two orders of mag..; ,
nitude below the transfer function for the room within which
the equi pment are housed.
• All of the equipment with exposed printed circuit boards, which
would normally suffer failures as a result of accumulation of
dust and dirt, were well protected by cabinet filter systems on
both natural and forced convection cooling systems, and by
properly designed dust covers and enclosures.
• There were surprisingly wide differences between the amount of
protection that individual commercial establishments provided
in the air filtration system for seemingly similar activities.
It was found that the type of filters used in the HVAC system
was often determined by the lowest cost for filters.
6.5 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
6.5.1 Penetration and Vulnerability Estimates
Data obtained during the field visits were used in the building
penetration model that was developed in Phase I to compute ranges of Air-
borne Exposure Transfer Functions (AETF) values. AETF values are
defined as the fraction of the outdoor carbon fiber exposure (in fiber~
seconds per cubic meter) that will be experienced in a particular inter-
nal area ofa building or other structure. The interna1 exposure
relates to the area as a whole, and not necessarily to the conditi~ns
inside a particular item of equipment. In mathematical terms this is
represented as
Exposure indoors = AETF x Exposure outdoors.
Both Summer and Winter seasons were considered in determining,
transfer function characteristics. Under some circumstances it was nec-
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essary to account for windows and doors being open in pleasant weather,
regardless of the fact that a forced air ventilation system was present
and in use. A range of transfer functions were calculated for the best
and worst conditions expected in each area investigated~ In almost all
cases, ranges were used because one or more of the penetration model's
parameter values (e.g., infiltration rate) could not be precisely
defined. Credit was taken for the possible beneficial effect of window
screens in those establishments where screens existed. A complete list-
ing of the AETF values used in the risk analysis may be found in Appendix
A. The underlying penetration model is described in Appendix F of the
Phase I report, Volume II.
The vulnerability of the equipment within a facility was quantified
by the mean dosage for failure (f). It was assumed that equipment fail-
ure probability would follow an exponential law, as given by:
-
Prob (failure at exposure E) = 1 _ e-E/ E
For low values of E, this probability is a nearly linear function
of exposure. Values of f for various equipment types were estimated
during the GFRAPQ program by both NASA and other government organita-
tions.* The final f values adopted for the risk analysis were prOVided
by NASA-Langley after review of the equipment summaries developed from
the individual site visits. These vulnerability estimates are also
listed in Appendix A.
6.5.2 Estimates of Facility Costs
A carbon fiber exposure at an industrial, commercial, or public
service facility may produce some amount of economic loss depending upon
the type of equipment damaged and its function in the operation of the
facility. In this analysis, we considered the costs associated with
repairing the equipment and the costs associated with disruption of the
facility's functions. The analysis revealed that given the external
*See reference 2 in Chapter 5.
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carbon fiber dosage expected, the tr~n~fer functions, and the measured
vulnerability of many classes pf electronic equipment, large scale
catastrophic disruption of normal functions would rarely occur. Rather,
the type of failures that might be experienced with various classes of
equipment would be extremely difficult to distinguish from the normal
failure rate for these equipment. Facility costs were analyzed for two
possible situations: first, the situation in which only equipment
repairs were necessary, and secondly the situation in which the opera-
tion of the facility was disrupted.
For the first situation, we developed a schedule of estimated costs
for repair that ranged from minor repair of small equipment such as home
appliances and office equipment up to the repair of complex equipment
such as large computers and telephone switching gear. This schedule o'f
costs is summarized in Table 6-2. For each severity index from A to E,
we described the type of equipment, the estimated time to diagnose and
repair the equipment, the number of repair persons required, and esti-
mates of labor costs and material costs required to effect the repair.
In a similar manner, we established facility costs for disr~ptions
that ranged from minor service disruptions up to critical service dis-
ruptions; these cases were assigned a severity index from A to C. The
estimated consequences of the facility disruptions were based upon the.
percent of the work force kept idle as well as identifiable loss of pro-
duct (i.e., manufactured units that would need to be scrapped as a
result of the disruption of manufacturing facilities). The schedule of
facility costs for disruptions is summarized in Table 6-3. Estimates
of average work force size and production volumes were obtained from
business census data for each major hub airport and each facility cate-
gory.
A master summary table was developed that includes all of the per-
tinent information assembled from the site visits and SUbsequent analy-
ses. This summary is given in Appendix Aand was used as input to the
risk analysis simulation program.
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TABLE 6-2
SCHEDULE OF COSTS FOR EQUIPMENT REPAIR
Labor Estimate
Time to No. of Cost at of
Severity Diagnose & Repair Approx. Materi a1 Total
Index Description Repair Persons $15/hr. Costs Cost
(hrs.)
---rrr ($) ($)
A Minor repair of appli~ 4 60 20 80
ances and non~specified
small equipment such as
CRT displays, typewriters
and small office equip-
ment.
B Minor repair of speci- 5 2 150 100 250
fied electronic and
electromechanical
equipment such as
copiers, radio equip-
ment and POS terminals.
C Repair of complex 10 4 600 200 800
small speci fi ed
equipment such as
small computers and
PBX systems.
D Repair of complex 20 6 1800 700 2500
specialty equipment
such as large com-
puters.
E Diagnosis and c1ean- 1% of 1i nes wi 11 be affected; repair 10 lines
ing of telephone lines. per hour at $15/hour plus $5/1ine for materials.
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TABLE 6-3
COSTS FOR FACILITY DISRUPTIONS
Severity
Index
A
B
C
Description
Minor service disruption.
Important service dis-
ruption.
Critical service disrup-
tion.
Consequence
5% of work force loses 4 hours of
production time at $15/hour;
negligible loss of product.
10% of work force loses 8 hours of
production time at $15/hour plus
identifiable loss of product.
50% of work force loses 8 hours of
production at $15 hour plus identi-
fiable loss of product.
7. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OF SINGLE ACCIDENT RISK PROFILE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
A computer simulation model was developed for estimating the potential
economic impacts of a carbon fiber release upon facilities within an 80
kilometer radius of a major airport. Assuming that an air carrier incident
or accident involving fire or explosion had released carbon fibers, the
model simulated the possible range of release conditions and the resulting
dispersion of carbon fibers. Each iteration of the model generated a
specific release scenario which would cause a specific amount of dollar
loss to the surrounding communities. The simulation generated thousands
of accidents, and for each one, random draws were performed from proba-
bility distributions describing the set of conditions for that accident.
By repeating the simulation many times a full range,of possible accident
types was developed, along with a distribution of the potential accident
consequences. Both the simulation model and the methodology used to
synthesize a national risk profile are very similar to the model and
procedures described in reference 1 of Chapter 2.
This chapter describes the mechanics of the simulation model which
was applied to each of the 26 large hub airports in the United States.
The risk profiles for these 26 cities each represented a distribution of
economic losses conditional on there being an accident at the given
airport. The development of the individual airport risk profiles was
part of a multi-step procedure used for the computation of the national
risk profile. The first step was the generation of the conditional
profile for each of the individual airports. The second was the synthesis
I
of these distributions into a single national distribution that was
again conditional on there being an accident. In the final step, which
is described in Chapter 8, the national probability of an accident was
combined with the conditional national profile to generate a risk pro-
file for annual national economic losses resulting from any number of
accidents.
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7.2 DESCRIPTION OF SIMULATION PROCEDURE
The general Monte Carlo procedure on which the model was based is
presented in Figure 7-1. For each iteration, release conditions and
relevant accident events were drawn from the appropriate probability
distributions. This release scenario was fed as input to a dispersion
model which calculated the dosage that would occur within each of forty
sectors of a geographic grid whose center was located at the airport.
An example of such a geographic grid is presented in Figure 7-2. From
the exposure distribution we used the penetration and vulnerability
characteristics of the facilities exposed and the economic anlyasis
model described in Chapter 6 to estimate the resulting economic losses
for each affected facility. The losses were then summed to determine
the total economic losses resulting from the simulated accident. Once
this procedure was complete the computer returned and simulated another
accident, drawing a new set of accident/incident details. This procedure
was repeated iteratively until enough samples had been taken to get a
reasonably accurate distribution of the economic losses resulting from
an accident. In this way we developed 26 individual risk profiles for
the large hub airports.
A large number of probabilistic events were used as input to the
Monte Carlo simulation procedure. The interactions between the various
components of these distributions and the deterministic data inputs are
illustrated by the flow chart in Figure 7-3. The question marks below
several boxes in the flow chart represent the probabilistic input vari-
ables. These were the weather variables, the accident model variables
described in Chapter 4, including the possibility of an explosive type
of release, and the remaining variables described in Chapter 5, which
determine the release conditions such as the amount of fiber released.
The underlying probabilistic inputs used to determine the release scen-
ario are fully presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. It is important to
recognize that all of these underlying probability distributions resulted
in separate random draws for each Monte Carlo iteration.
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FIGURE 7-2
DISTRIBUTION OF SECTORS AROUND
LOGAN AIRPORT. BOSTON. MA
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Arthur D Little, Inc.
The individual random variables incorporated within the simulation
procedure were the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The probability of fire/explosive release (two distributions -
one for static and certain types of take-off· accidents and one
for others).
Probability of explosion given fire/explosive mode
Aircraft Size
Orientation of runway (two distributions - one for take-off
and one for landing).
Angle from runway
Distance from end of runway (two distributions - one for take-
off and one for landing)
Stability Class
Temperature
Wind Direction
Speed Class (six distributions - one for each stability class)
Percent of carbon fibers consumed (three distributions - one
for each size class)
Duration of the fire
Percent of fuel burned
Carbon fibers on aircraft (three distributions - one for each
size class)
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To calculate the exposure distribution in each sector of the geo-
graphic grid a large number of exposure calculations were performed
within the simulation. This was accomplished in two steps. In the
first step exposures were calculated for each of four points uniformly
distributed within the sector. The sectors with the maximum exposures
were flagged and then exposures were calculated for 50 additional points
in the five sectors lying in the same direction as the sector of maximum
exposure. 50 points were determined by a five fold subdivision of each
sector along the radial direction and a ten fold subdivision along the
angular direction. After the exposures were computed along these lines
the percentage of geographic area was computed in each decade corresponding
to exposures from 10 to 1010 fiber seconds per cubic meter. These per-
centage distributions were used to directly calculate economic loss. In
determining the appropriate decade of exposure corresponding to each
sample geographic point, the base 10 logarithm of the exposure was evalu-
ated and rounded to the nearest integer value.
The final part of the simulation was the computation of economic
losses in each sector of the metropolitan area. To perform this step
the number of facilities in each sector was obtained from census data
for each city classified by facility categories. It was assumed that
the fraction of facilities receiving different levels of exposure were
given by the exposure distribution in that sector. By using these frac-
tions and the building penetration and equipment failure rates presented
in Chapter 6, the economic losses for each sector and then for each
metropolitan area were computed.
An example of the outcome of a typical computer simulation is shown
in Figure 7-4. In this case, the computer generated a hypothetical
accident at LaGuardia airport relatively close to the center of the
runway. The aircraft involved was a medium jet in a static or taxi
phase which somehow caught fire. About 8,500 kilograms of fuel were
burned over a period of 30 minutes, releasing 22 kilograms of carbon
fibers. There was a delayed explosion during the fire. Based on ran-
domly drawn weather conditions, the carbon fiber cloud moved westward,
toward New York City, creating exposures as high as 108 fiber-seconds
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BRONX
FLUSHING
RELEASE CONDITIONS
Fuel Burned - 8470 kg
Time of Burn - 33.5 min.
CF released - 22 kg ,
WEATHER CONDITIONS
Neutral Atmosphere (D)
Wind from East at 7 m/sec
Temperature: 10 C
CONSEQUENCES
108 Exposure at Airport
107 Exposure within 3 km of Airport
Total Dollar Losses $178
Household Losses $66
FIGURE 7-4
ILLUSTRATION OF A TYPICAL SIMULATION RUN AT LAGUARDIA AIRPORT
per cubic meter at the airport, and 107 fiber seconds per cubic meter
within three kilometers of the airport. The resulting losses due to
equipment failures amounted to a total of $178 of which households
accounted for $66. By performing hundreds of iterations like this one,
the computer generated a risk profile for LaGuardia airport.
7.3 SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE LARGE HUB AIRPORTS
Using the input probability distributions described in the previous
section as well as the economic data described in Chapter 6, conditional
risk profiles were developed for each of the 26 hub airports. The mean,
the standard deviation, and several percentiles for these distributions
are presented in Table 7-1. Note that the distributions are all skewed.
That is, the tail corresponding to losses larger than the median is more
extended than the tail corresponding to losses less than the median. As
a result of this, the standard deviations are far greater than the means.
In performing the individual city simulations a different number of
Monte Carlo iterations was used for each city. The total number of
iterations for all 26 cities was 10,000. However, in order to develop
the greatest accuracy in the national conditional risk profile given a
total of 10,000 iterations, it was necessary to set the number of itera-
tions for each city to a value proportional to the conditional probability
that an accident occurs in that city given that an accident occurred
somewhere in the U.S. (the reasons for this are discussed in Chapter 8).
The appropriate conditional probabilities for each city are presented in
Table 4-1. Because the conditional probabilities of the cities vary so
widely, the number of Monte Carlo iterations ranges from 138 for the
case of Phoenix, which had the lowest conditional probability, to 1346
for Chicago which had the highest conditional probability. Thus, for
example, an accident was 1346/138 times as likely to occur in Chicago as
it was in Phoenix, and because of this the national risk profile required
more accuracy (and hence more iterations) for the Chicago risk profile
than for Phoenix. The number of iterations used for each city is pre-
sented in Table 7-2.
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TABU 7-1
CONDITIONAL RISK PROFILES fOR 26 AIRPORTS
Standard 5 10 25 50 75 90 95 ..
~l!l Mean ueviation Minimum Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent MaxilllJm
---
Atlanta 24 53.5 0 0 0 1.0 5.0 20.0 60.7 113.1 433.2
Boston 53 115.1 0 0 0 0 6.0 56.5 171.2 251.5 1102.8 .
Chicago 222 543.5 U 0 0 9.5 57.5 166.9 541.9 848.6 7032.4
Cleveland 3BO 930.9 0 0 1.3 22.1 100.3 343.1 769.2 1355.9 6952.2
I}a 11 as 33 72.4 0 0 0 .9 5.0 24.6 99.3 188.6 590.5
Denver 30 103.2 0 0 0 1.1 6.8 26.0 64.8 105.0 1559.7
lJetroit 1184 2404.7 0 0 0 9.7 211.3 939.6 3728.5 5639.6 16429.0
Honolulu 7 21.1 0 0 0 0 .1 2.2 12.5 51.9 131.7
Houston 38 111.9 0 0 0 .1 1.8 13.8 124.4 183.8 1013.0
Kansas City 16 35.1 0 0 .1 .6 2.8 14.1 43.8 85.1 232.3
Kennedy 173 419.3 0 0 0 2.7 34.0 142.1 479.2 799.3 4644.0
IaGuardia 170 434.3 0 0 0 5.8 31. 7 137.4 398.2 705.4 5113.7
las Vegas 12 127.8 0 0 0 .1 .8 2.4 6.2 20.9 1806.8
los Angeles 439 1030.6 0 0 0 1.8 80.8 511.4 1155.5 2092.6 20277 .0
Miami 29 74.9 0 .0 0 0 2.6 24.0 71.9 139.7 569.0
Minneapo1is 349 4876.4 0 0 0 .5 4.1 17.6 62.8 141. 7 73974.0
~ewark 209 420.6 0 0 0 13.5 61.B 206.5 579.5 807.9 3399.4
New Orleans 14 43.6 0 0 0 .3 2.0 8.5 25.1 60.8 397.2
Philadelphia 89 .209.9 0 0 0 3.4 19.1 63.7 258.3 464.2 1782.7
Phoenix 34 101.9 {) 0 0 .2 3.3 19.6 83.8 169.1 950.4
Pittsburgh 61 115.4 0 0 .3 2.7 n.5 57.0 170.6 330.4 741.3
co
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TABLE 7-1
CONDITIONAL RISK PROFILES FOR 26 AIRPORTS
(Continued)
Standard 5 10 25 50 75 90 95
*~ Mean Deviation Minimum Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Ma xi I1IJm
San
Francisco 52 104.6 0 0 0 3.3 15.9 63.3 125.2 154.3 1149.8
Seattle 47 147.4 0 0 .2 1.5 9.1 42.3 105.9 151.0 1848.6
St. louis 148 494.1 0 0 0 3.0 21.4 104.9 335.9 688.7 7889.1
Tampa 18 35.5 0 0 0 .9 5.3 19.5 50.6 68.0 223.7
Washington 35 87.5 0 0 0 1.7 8.0 30.1 105.9 137.8 1010.5
*Expected percentile is N/N+1. where N is number of iterations from Table 7-2.
TABLE-7-2
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO ITERATIONS BY CTry
Iterations
Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Cleveland
Da 11 as
Denver
Detroit
Honolulu
Houston
Kansas City
Kennedy
LaGuardia
Las Vegas
Los Angeles
Miami
Minneapolis
Newark
New Orleans
Ph il ade 1ph i a
. Phoenix
Pittsburgh
San Francisco
Seattle
St. Louis
Tampa
Washington
87
771
343
1346
223
653
336
348
143
322
234
753
340
200
852
333
230
208
174
259
138
339
294
252
392
201
316
The conditional economic loss profiles for 26 hub airports consti-
tute a major intermediate result in our risk analysis work. It should
be noted, however, that the maximum observed losses represent sample
maxima for this simulation. Statistically, if there are NMonte Carlo
iterations for a given city, then on average the maximum, represents the per-
centile corresponding to N/N+1. We therefore assumed these percentiles in the
synthesis of the national risk profile. However, there was some question
regarding maximum values obtained from the simulation. For any given
city a loss higher than the maximum could conceivably occur. In order
to ~evelop a confidence bound for the probability of a loss higher than
the maximum observed we utilized the binomial probability distribution.
Suppose that the probability per accident of given loss is~. Then
using the binomial distribution the probability of not observing any
such losses in N simulation trials is
(1 _~)N
To determine a 95% cofidence bound we set the above expression equal to
5% which yields a value of ~ = 3/N. Thus, for example, a 95% confidence
bound for Chicago, for which 1,346 iterations were run, is 3/1346 or 1
in 449. For the national profile analagous statements can be made and
these are presented in Chapter 8.
7.4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The magnitudes and range of losses in Table 7-1 indicate that the
losses in accidents at the 26 hub airports are moderate. In fact, the
losses are significantly less than a previous analysis presented in
Phase I (see reference 1 of Chapter 2). There are two major reasons for
this significant decrease in losses. The principal reason is that present
estimates of equipment vulnerability and economic loss are significantly
less than those assumed in Phase I. In addition, of course, there have
been additional data gathered and experimental findings on CF amounts
release and on the relationships among the various release conditions.
Both of these effects have tended to reduced the distribution of economic
loss.
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To test the relative importance of the two major modifications in
modelling efforts, that is revised economic estimates and increased
accuracy in the release condition models, the conditional risk profile
for the city of Boston was run using the revised models for release
conditions but maintaining the economic model used in ~hase I. With
these input conditions, the mean loss was $90,000 per accident, the
standard deviation was $175,000, the 90th percentile was $336,000, and
maximum was 1.46 million dollars. Although these numbers represent a
decrease in the loss distribution compared with the Phase I Boston risk
profile (A mean of $120,000, maximum of $3.1 million) the two risk pro-
files are comparable. However, with the introduction of revised economic
data, the Boston profile decreased to the level presented in Table 7-1.
We therefore concluded that the revised cost and vulnerability estimates
have significantly reduced the risk of economic losses.
We also performed a sensitivity analysis to estimate modelling errors
by varying several of the key input parameters. The results are shown
in Figure 7-5. This analysis was run on the individual airport risk
profiles which have the highest mean loss for the 26 hubs, namely Detroit.
Of the three parameters tested, the largest increase in risk was obtained
by setting the composite on the aircraft at its highest possible value -
15,652 kilograms. This increased the mean loss per incident by a factor
of about 7 and increased the standard deviation and maximum value of the
losses by a factor of about 4.5. Restricting the simulation models to
only explosive releases increased the statistics by a factor of 2 Or 3,
while setting the atmospheric stability classes to E (moderately stable
weather) increased the loss distribution only slightly. The two latter
conditions are those which tend to result in highest exposure downwind
of the release point. We concluded that modelling errors can contribute
less than an order of magnitude to the uncertainty of the risk profile.
A final consideration of model sensitivity was the incorporation of
other possible sources of randomness. A great many of the model calcula-
tions were made on a deterministic basis. For example, given a set of
release conditions and an exposure distribution within a metropolitan
area, we assumed that the economic losses would be equal to the expected
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Changes in risk profile due to variation of input parameters, tested for the
airport with highest mean dollar loss
Resulting Increases from Base Case
Parameter Mean Dollar Standard Maximum
Tested Loss Deviation Dollar Loss
($1184) ($2409) ($16,429)
Composite on
t by 7Aircraft Set at t tby 4.5Max. (15,652) by 4.5
100% Explosive tby 3 t tby 2.5Releases I by 2(no plume release)
Stability t by 1.5 t by 1.2 tby 1.1Class Set at E
(moderately stable)
FIGURE 7-5
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
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economic losses based on that exposure distribution. In fact, at low
levels of exposure, the dominating source of randomness for the entire
phenomenon was the randomness of the individual failure events of the
various pieces of equipment exposed. To examine the effect of this
source of variability within the overall context, an a1ternative method
for generating risk profiles was developed. This method was used only
for the national risk profile and is discussed in the following chapter.
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8. SYNTHESIS OF NATIONAL RISK PROFILE
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the methodology used and resul~s obtained in
computing the national risk profile. The computation was performed by
use of the 26 individual conditional risk profiles under theconserva-
tive assumption that all U.S. air carrier accidents occur at the 26 hub
airports. The risk profile was obtained using the 1993 carbon fiber
utilization forecast, but numbers of facilities were taken from 1972 and
1975 census data, while the losses were expressed in 1977 dollars.
As noted in Chapter 7, we developed two kinds of national risk pro-
files in the analysis. One of them was the risk profile for a single
incident which gave a distribution of dollar losses resulting from any
one air carrier accident, and this was derived by taking a mixture of
the individual risk profiles for a single incident weighted by the proba-
bility that an accident takes place at each airport. The second type of
profile was a national annual risk profile which showed the distribution
of the total annual losses due to accidents involving carbon fibers.
This annual risk profile incorporates the possibility of 1, 2, 3 or more
accidents involving carbon fiber releases during one year. To derive
the annual risk profile we began with the national risk profile for a
single incident and performed a convolution procedure based on a Poisson
distribution of accidents with mean equal to the annual frequency of
such accidents. The procedural steps are illustrated in Figure 8-1.
We also developed an annual risk profile based on a Poisson model
for the number of equipment failures. This procedure was used by Arthur
D. Little in development of the dollar loss distribution relating to
carbon fiber releases from general aviation accidents.* The purpose of
the approach was to accurately account for the randomness due to the
failure process. The trade-offs involved in the use of this procedure
are discussed in Section 8.6, but the risk profiles using the two methods
* See reference 2, Chapter 2.
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did not show substantial differences. An additional advantage of the
Poisson analytic procedure is that it overcomes problems related to
statistical estimation of high losS events. The probability of such
high loss events are low, and as a result the statistical confidence
bounds relating to these probabilities show a moderate deviation from
the estimated values.
8.2 Major Assumptions
Before proceding to the results of the risk analysis, it is important
to note the major assumptions that entered into the analysis. The first
major assumption was that all U.S. air carrier accidents occur at the 26
hub airports. Since large hubs account for 68% of passenger enplanements
and about 59% of airplane departures, this assumption is not unreasonable.
It is conservative in the sense that larger hubs tend to show a higher
conditional risk since they are generally associated with higher densities
of facilities.
The second major assumption was that atmospheric conditions were
assumed to remain constant during the dispersion of the carbon fiber
cloud. This is a somewhat unrealistic assumption since weather conditions
are constantly changing and a cloud moving at a rate of a few kilometers
per hour could take as much as a day to cover 80 kilometers. However,
it would be too complex to simulate different atmospheric conditions in
different geographic sectors, and therefore this assumption was made.
The assumption is not expected to prodwce any bias into the risk analysis
since the variation of atmospheric conditions will sometimes increase
and sometimes decrease the resulting exposures.
The third assumption was that there would be no precipitation, which
is conservative since if precipitation does occur it may wash out some
of the fibers, resulting in lower airborne exposures on the ground. It
was found that there was a high likelihood of rain or other forms of
precipitation being associated with aircraft accidents, since many of
the accidents in the historical data base occurred in IFR (instrument
flight rules) weather.
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The fourth assumption was that for a given facility category all
facilities are equal in size, equipment inventory, and financial char-
acteristics. Again, this is a necessary assumption due the enormous
volume of data that would have to be processed in order to identify all
the different sizes and scales of facilities that do exist. Instead we
took the average case based on regional statistics for 'each facility
category and attempted to model a typical vulnerable facility. The
variation of facility characteristics would introduce a little more
variation into the risk profile, but should not affect the results too
greatly because of the large number of,facilities involved that would
tend to average each other out.
The fifth major assumption was that all equipment is activated and
failures occur immediately after exposure. This. assumes, first of all,
that equipment which is exposed is in an activated state and is vulnerable
to the fibers at the time of exposure. Since some fraction of electronic
equipment exposed will not be activated, this tends to be a conservative
assumption. On the other hand, there is a phenomenon of post-exposure
vulnerability, in which the fibers that are deposited upon equipment do
not cause a problem immediately but will affect the equipment when it is
turned on at a later date. This phenomenon was not modelled explicitly
but was taken into account by assuming continuous activation and failure
immediately after exposure.
The final major assumption was that the number of failures for a
given scenario would be equal to the expected number of failures based
on equipment vulnerabilities and the exposure distribution. As noted,
the number of failures was a random variable based on this expectation.
To determine the sensitivity of the results with respect to this assump-
tion the alternative Poisson analytic model was developed.
8.3 DEVELOPMENT OF A CONDITIONAL NATIONAL RISK PROFILE
The first step in the synthesis of the national profile was to develop
a conditional distribution for loss given an accident anywhere in the
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country. That is to say, if there was an accident somewhere in the U.S.
involving a jet aircraft using carbon fibers and resulting in a fire or
explosion, the distribution of losses is given by this conditional profile.
The profile is obtained by a simple probabilistic mixture of the 26
individual conditional risk profiles.
Formally,
Where
F(X) = Probability that total loss is greater than or equal to
X given an accident in the U.S.
Fi(X) = Probability that loss is greater than or equal to X given
an accident at airport i
Pi = Conditional probability that an accident occurs at airport
i given that it occurred in the U.S.
To compute the conditional national risk profile we computed F(X)
from the above equation for several dollar values. This computation
involved two technical tasks before the equation could be evaluated.
These were
• Computation of Pi
<. Computation of the Fi(X) for given values of X
The determination of the Pi is presented in Chapter 4 and the values
are presented in Table 4-1. The 26 individual risk profiles were ex-
pressed in terms of fixed percentiles rather than the fixed dollar values
required by the equation. To determine the Fi(X) for fixed dollar values,
we performed a logarithmic interpolation of the points in the inidividual
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risk profiles. That is, a straight line WqS connected between the fixed
percentile data on a logarithmic basis. Logarithmic interpolation was
preferred to linear interpolation because of the concave nature of the
risk profile. The maximum dollar value for each city represented an
expected percentile of N/N + 1, where Nwas the number ,of Monte Carlo
iterations for that city. We terminated the computation at a value of
$75,000 as this was approximately the maximum loss calculated in the 26
original simulations. (It was observed for Minneapolis.) To extrapolate
the 25 risk profiles for which this value was not observed, a log-linear
relationship was again utilized.
The national conditional risk profile computed by the above procedure
is shown in Table 8-1 and is presented graphically in Figure 8-2.
The mean value or expected loss per incident was $173, but there was a
large variation in loss; the standard deviation was $969. While one-
quarter of the accidents exceeded approximately $75 in loss, only 2%
exceeded $1500 in loss.
Although we could not develop valid statistical confidence bounds
for the annual risk profile, statistical confidence bounds for the con-
ditional national risk profile were developed. A discussion of the
methodology involved in deriving such a confidence bound is presented in
Appendix H of reference 1, Chapter 2. As an example of this type of
confidence bound, a 95% upper confidence bound for the conditional proba-
bility that an accident results in a loss in excess of the maximum ob-
served in the simulation is equal to
3 x Max (Pi/Ni)
i~l to 26
(8.1)
where Pi is defined above and Ni is the number of simulation trials for
city i.
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TABLE 8-1
NATIONAL CONDITIONAL
RISK PROFILE
(1993 )
Losses X
10
75
300
500
800
1,500
3,000
6,000
10,000
15,000
40,000
70,000
Cumulative
Probability
of Losses
Less Than X
.49
.75
.897
.929
.958
.980
.991
.9968
.9987
.9993
.9998
.99985
Probabi 1i ty
of Losses
Greater
Than X
.51
.25
.103
.071
.042
.020
.009
.0032
.0013
7 x 10- 4
2 X 10- 4
-41.5 x 10
Expected Annual
Frequency*
of Incidents
With Losses
Greater Than X
1.4
.68
.28
.19
.113
.054
.024
.0086
.0035
1.9xlO- 3
-45.4 x 10
-44.1 x 10
*Based on an average of 2.7 jet accidents per year involving CF
composites and fire
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FIGURE 8-2
AIR CARRIERS 1993 NATIONAL CONDITIONAL RISK PROFILE AND
UPPER AND LOWER 95% CONFIDENCE BOUNDS DUE TO STATISTICAL ERRORS IN SIMULATION
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In order to ensure maximum accuracy in our simulation, we determined
values of Ni such that this upper confidence bound probability would be
minimized but the total number of simulation trials would not be ex-
cessive. (We set the total number to 10,000). We therefore designed
the simulation so that all 26 values of Pi/Ni would be approximately
equal. For Chicago, for example, which represented a Pi ~f .1346, the
highest number of Monte Carlo simulations (1346) was generated. Note
that 1,346 trials drawn from a segment representing 13.46 percent of
the possibilities is equivalent to
1346 =
.1346 10,000
for 100% of the possibilities. In other words our simulation was de-
signed to be accurate to an equivalent 10,000 iterations for a non-
stratified sample. Based on 8.1, the upper confidence bound for a loss
in excess of maximum observed is 3/10,000.
The above considerations were used to develop the confidence bounds
for the risk profile. Based on the number of observations exceeding any
loss value, confidence bounds were developed assuming a Poisson proba-
bility distribution. The stratification of the sample was taken into
account in these calculations. The resulting confidence bounds are also
depicted in Figure 8-2 and presented in tabular form in Table 8-2.
8.4 CONVOLUTION PROCEDURE FOR NATIONAL PROFILE
To develop a national risk profile for the total annual losses without
regard to the number of accidents, the following formula was used:
F(X) = P(l)F(l)(X) + P(2)F(2)(X) + ...
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TABLE 8-2
CONFIDENCE BOUNDS (5% OF EACH TAIL)
FOR CONDITIONAL NATIONAL RISK PROFILE
DUE TO STATISTICAL ERROR IN
SIMULATION AND NO OTHER UNCERTAINTY
Do11 ar Va1ue
75
300
800
3,000
10,000
40,000
75,000
Lower Confidence
Bound on Probability
of Loss
Exceeding Value
.24
.098
-23.9 x 10
-37.6 x 10
-48.4 x 10
-57.5 x 10
o
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Upper Confidence Bound
on Probability
of Loss Exceeding
Given Value
.26
.108
-2'4.5 x 10
-21.07 x 10
32.0 x 10
-46.4 x 10
3 X 10- 4
where
P(i) = Probability that i accidents occur per year, which equals
the probability that a Poisson variate with parameter 2.7
is equal to i
F(i)(X) = Probability that loss exceeds X given accidents
F(X) = Probability that total annual loss exceeds X
The procedure to compute the F(i)(X) involves a mathematical inte-
gration procedure known as convolution. A computer program was developed
to convolve the conditional national risk profile up to 21 times (at
which point the remaining terms in the above expression were negligible.)
The resulting unconditional risk profile is presented in Table 8-3 and
Figure 8-3. It expresses the probability distribution of total annual
losses from all carbon fiber accidents regardless of the magnitude of
any individual accidents. The horizontal axis shows the total economic
losses in dollars as a result of carbon fiber accidents during a given
year. The vertical axis shows the annual probability of exceeding each
dollar loss value. For example, the annual loss of approximately 1,000
dollars would be exceeded with a probability of 10-1, in other words,
once every 10 years. An annual loss of $10,000 would occur about once
every 600 years. The expected annual losses due to carbon fiber released
from air carrier fires in 1993 is about $467. It should be noted that
this includes only those losses incurred by failures of equipment in the
civilian sector.
8.5 CONFIDENCE BOUND FOR NATIONAL RISK PROFILE
Figure 8-3 also presents confidence bounds for the national annual
risk profile. One of the more important issues concerning the risk pro-
file is its statistical accuracy. For example, one may inquire about
the true probability of a loss in excess of $50,000 dollars. To answer
such questions we derived the confidence bound depicted in Figure 8-3.
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TABLE 8-3
NATIONAL ANNUAL RISK PROFILE - 1993
Losses X
75
150
300
500
800
1,500
6,000
10,000
70,000
100,000
Probabi 1i ty Tha t
Annual Losses Exceed X
.57
.43
.39
.24
.16
.07
.019
.0016
.0006
3.5 x 10- 4
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NATIONAL ANNUAL RISK PROFILE FOR CARBON FIBER
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The possible sources of errors in generating the risk profile con-
sist of
• Statistical accuracy of the conditional profiles
• Statistical errors in the estimates of sample parameters
• Errors in assumptions about values of constants
• Possible variability in parameters
Any errors in the various stages of the analysis will therefore
impact one or both of the risk profiles. All of the above sources of
errors are discussed in this section.
The first and second sources of errors represent the statistical
errors in the construction of the risk profile. If the model is valid,
that is if there is no variability in parameters and if there are no
errors or biases in assumptions about values of constants, then a statis-
tical confidence bound reflects all of the errors in the estimation of
the national risk profile. Figure 8-2 and Table 8-2 present the statis-
tical confidence bounds for the conditional national risk profile. Note
that the error in this risk profile is small at the low and medium sec-
tionsof the loss range. but can be substantial at the high end of the
loss range due to the low frequency of simulated accidents involving
high losses. At the high end of the loss range the width of the confi-
dence bound is still less than an order of magnitude, although this may
be compounded in the annual national risk profile.
With regard to the sources of error due to statistical errors in the
estimates of sqmple parameters, most parameter estimates are based on a
large body of statistical data. For example, the number of operations
used to estimate the values of Pi and the weather statistics used in
development of the airport profiles are based on large numbers of obser-
vations, and hence there is generally very little error in the estimates.
There is one variable, namely the estimated number of accidents per
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year, that has a significant impact on the annual risk profile and is
subject to some uncertainty. As noted in Chapter 4, a confidence bound
for the expected number of potential CF release accidents per year ranges
from 75% to 130% of the estimated value. Since the estimated value is
2.7 accidents per year, the confidence range for the expected number of
fire accidents per year is 2.0 to 3.5. This range could also add un-
certainty at the high loss end of the annual risk profile.
With respect to the third possible source of error, the various
assumptions of the model have been documented in this report. For some
of these assumptions, such as constant atmospheric conditions, the im-
pacts are unclear. Confidence bounds for many of these assumptions will
necessarily be judgmental. However, for some of the constants the sensi-
tivity analysis presented earlier in the chapter gives an indication of
the relative impact of the assumption. In particular, these analyses
show that even under extremely conservative assumptions, possible dollar
losses will not be extremely large.
The final source of errors was the probabilistic variability of
values assumed to be constant. We believe that most of the sources of
such variability will not have a great impact on the annual risk profile.
There is one area of variability, however, that could be significant and
this deals with the random nature of the failure of events. Recall that
within the simulation model, the actual number of failures in any economic
loss category is assumed to be equal to the expected number of failures
given the exposure distribution for the given release and the geographic
distribution of facilities. In fact, the actual number of failures will
be a Poisson random variable with the expectation as its mean, and this
can be significant when the number of expected failures is small. To
investigate the effect of this source of variability an analytic model
was developed which is described in the next section.
Due to all of these sources of error, we estimated the confidence
bounds as depicted in Figure 8-3. Confidence bounds are wider at the high
loss values to reflect the statistical error in the conditional national
risk profile discussed previously.
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8.6 ANALYTIC APPROACH TO TH~ NATIONAL RISK PROFILE
Because of the possible sources of error using a Monte Carlo simula-
tion approach, an alternative methodology was developed to compute the
national risk profile. There are several issues involved in determining
which of the two types of methodologies might be appropriate. A simula-
tion model was appropriate for large releases which would result in
large numbers of failures. In this case, the simulation model allows
detailed identification of the geographic distribution of the facilities
as well as the different possible accident and release conditions. The
higher the number of failures, of course, the lower the relative impact
of statistical fluctuations of the actual number of failures relative to
the expected number of failures. As noted previously, however, the
simulation approach results in statistical uncertainty at the high loss
tail of the risk profile.
In an analysis of the possible economic losses resulting from carbon
fiber releases from general aviation fire accidents*, it was noted that
the number of failures per incident was expected to be extremely small
and the dominant variation in economic losses would appear to be caused
by the random failure process rather than by variations in physical
conditions. In addition, there were not sufficient data available to
allow detailed modelling of release and dispersion scenarios. Fo~
these reasons an analytical model was developed to analyze losses due to
general aviation accidents. We then investigated the appropriateness of
this model for the analysis of air carrier-related losses.
The details of the analytic model will not be presented here, but
the important assumptions required are as follows:
• Exposure values are nearly always substantially lower than
outside exposures to failure.
• Variations in expected number of failures due to variations in
accident location within a metropolitan area, weather conditions,
and all release conditions except total amount of carbon fiber
* See reference 3, Chapter 2
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released, are small compared with the variation due to the
randomness of failure.
• If the second assumption is invalid then it is assumed
that equipments are uniformly distributed within the metro~
politan area in question.
It is shown in reference 2 of Chapter 2 that the first two assumptions
are valid for releases up to several kilograms. For the case of air
carrier accidents, the total amount of carbon fibers released can be as
large as several hundred kilograms. However, such large releases are
uncommon and even in the event of a large release the equipment categories
for which the second assumption is not completely valid can be charac-
terized by generally uniform distributions of locations. The most im-
portant example of such an equipment category is household goods.
Assuming that the assumptions of the analytic model are valid, it
then follows that the number of failures conditional on an accident
occurring is a Poisson random variable with a mean value directly pro-
portional to the amount of carbon fibers released and the density of
facilities, and inversely proportional to the mean outside exposure to
failure. On this basis a probability distribution can be developed for
the total number of failures given an accident or the total number of
failures that occur nationally in a year.
In order to develop the analytic model, we used the data on proba-
bility of an explosive release, maximum percent of carbon fibers released,
percentage of composite consumed, probability of each size aircraft, and
distribution of total mass of carbon fibers on various aircraft in 1993.
Synthesizing all of these distributions, we developed a probability
distribution for total number of fibers released per accident in 1993.
This distribution, which is presented in Table 8-4, also incorporates
the assumption that there are 5 x 109 single fibers per kilogram of
carbon fiber mass.
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TABLE 8-4
APPROXIMATE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
FOR NUMBER OF
FIBERS RELEASED
Number of Fibers X
74 x 10
3.9 X 108
1.4 X 109
3.3 X 109
6 X 10 9
1.4 X 1010
2.2 X 10 10
3.6 X 1010
4.8 X 1010
6.4 X 10 10
8.9 X 10 10
1.2 X lOll
1.5xl011
2.1 X lOll
4.1 X lOll
1.2 X 10 12
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Probability That
Number of Fibers is Less
Than or Equal to X
.0001
.005
.029
.069
. 152
.242
.307
.402
.512
.637
.714
.849
.939
.989
.9998
1.0
Using the same computer program to analyze the Poisson model that
was used for the general aviation analysis, we developed a probability
distribution for the number of equipment failures occurring per accident
(Table 8-5). Within the program, facility densities wer~ required by
county and we assumed a uniform distribution of accident locations among
all the counties in each of the 26 metropolitan areas. We then converted
this distribution for number of failures into a distribution for dollar
losses by mu1tip1ing each value of dollar loss by the average dollar
loss per failure of $330. This average dollar loss per failure was also
an output from the computer program that performed the Poisson analysis.
Because individual dollar losses can exceed the average dollar loss, the
actual national risk profile will show more varian~e than the risk pro-
file that we developed in this manner. However, we believe that this
excess variance is relatively small, especially at the tail end of the
distribution which correspond to larger numbers of failures.
The risk profile developed in this manner is depicted in Figure 8-4
along with the profile developed from the Monte Carlo procedure. It may
be seen that the two profiles are roughly comparable, with their mean
values differing by only a factor of 3. The Poisson model gave an ex-
pected loss per accident of $452, which is equivalent to an annual ex-
pected loss of $1220, assuming 2.7 accidents per year involving CF releases.
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TABLE 8-5
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR NUMBER OF FAILURES
PER ACCIDENT (1993) BASED ON POISSON MobEl
Number of Failures X
o
1
2
3
4
5
10
15
20
30
50
70
90
200
800
1000
Probability That Number
Of Failures Exceeds X
.28
.15
.10
.073
.057
.047
.024
.015
.01l
.0063
.0027
.0016
.001
_5
7.4 x 10
6.2 x 10- 7
9 x 10- 9
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9. CONCLUSIONS
9. 1 NATIONAL RISK
The results of the risk analysis described in the preceding chapters
indicate that the potential economic losses due to electrical effects of
carbon fibers released from commercial aircraft fires are relatively low.
This is mainly due to the low probability of a significant number of
equipment failures resulting from an accidental release, and the moderate
costs associated with such failures. The expected national annual risk
was only $467 (measured in 1977 dollars) based on an estimated 2.7 acci-
dents with fire per year involving commercial aircraft carrying carbon
fiber composites in 1993. These results, obtained by a Monte Carlo
simulation approach, were verified using a simpler analytic model, which
yielded expected annual losses of $1220 (or $452 per accidental fire).
Thus, at least on an expected value basis, the risks due to CF usage
were found to be much lower than other risks associated with the operation
of commercial aircraft.
In performing a risk assessment, however, it is not sufficient to
compute an expected value. One must also consider the possibility of
highly unlikely events involving extremely large losses. We therefore
devoted considerable attention to quantifying the probability of high-
loss events which form the I'tail" of the risk profile shown in Figure 8-3.
It was estimated that annual losses of $10,000 would occur about once
every 600 years. The maximum loss observed from anyone simulated acci-
dental release was $75,000, but it is conceivable that higher losses
could occur if a large release of CF took place in a densely populated
area. Confidence bounds were estimated which indicate that annual
losses in excess of $75,000 would occur at most once every 100 years.
This level of risk is still relatively low when one considers the fre-
quency of natural or man-made disasters involving millions of dollars
in economic losses. (See Reference 1, Chapter 2 for a further discussion
of comparative risks,)
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The risk analysis of CF releases from commercial aircraft incorporated
a number of important assumptions which contributed to the uncertainties
in the risk profile. Even with these uncertainties, the sensitivity analysis
procedure was able to quantify the national risks within an order of mag-
nitude confidence interval, except for the high-loss tail of the risk profile.
major assumptions that entered into the analysis are described in the next
section.
9.2 IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES
Certain assumptions were necessary in the risk analysis either be-
cause precise information was not available in certain areas, or because
the scope of the study did not require a more exact determination. The
most important of these assumptions are listed below, and the anticipated
effect of each one upon the resultant risk profile is indicated. These
effects fall into three categories: Conservative, implying an overestima-
tlon of risk; non-conservative, implying an underestimation of risk; and
unclear, implying that no definite effect upon the risk can be expected
in either direction. Most of the assumptions that were adopted are
conservative, but particularly in the area of economic loss estimation
there may be additional costs which were not included.
• When CF composites are exposed to fire and/or explosion, up to
2.5% of the CF mass can be released in the form of airborne
fibers.
Effect: Conservative. Experiments by NASA and other groups
indicate that much lower release levels are likely.
• All CF released from a fire would be in the form of single
fibers, rather than groups or clumps of fibers.
Effect: Con~ervative. Single fibers will disperse farthest,
and have the greatest potential for penetrating to equipment.
(The one possible exception is the vulnerability of power
stations to clumps of fiber.)
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• All fibers released would have a length of 3 mm.
Effect: Conservative. Shorter fibers will have less
chance of damaging equipment, whereas longer fibers will
not be able to penetrate vents and filters as effectively.
• Atmospheric conditions remain constant during dispersion
of the carbon fiber cloud.
Effect: Unclear. Though weather will fluctuate, the
net effect on dispersion should average out over many
simulation trials.
• The presence of precipitation was ignored in the dispersion
analysis.
Effect: Conservative. Precipitation would tend to wash
out airborne fibers and reduce downwind exposures.
• Within a facility category, all facilities were assumed
to be similar in terms of penetration properties and
economic characteristics.
Effect: Unclear. Considerable variations will exist
among facilities, but these will average out when losses
are aggregated over a large area.
• Equipment was assumed to be in an activated state during
exposure.
Effect: Conservative. Reactivation of equipment after
exposure may produce failures, but vulnerability in such
a case is most probably reduced.
• Secondary impacts of business interruption were not included
in the economic loss estimate.
Effect: Non~conservative. The shutdown of one facility
may have subsequent impact upon other sectors of business
or society at large (e.g., mass transit, telephone system).
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• The amount of vulnerable electronic equipment was assumed
to remain at current levels.
Effect: Non-conservative. Rapid growth is expected in
the electronics industry during the next decade:
• Costs associated with decontamination and precautionary
procedures were not incorporated.
Effect: Non-conservative. The cost of anticipating
failures due to CF release or of preventing additional
failures subsequent to a release may be significant~
especially at vital installations such as airports.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC LOSS DATA FOR THE RISK ANALYSIS
The complete set of penetration, vulnerability, and cost data used
in the economic analysis is presented in Table A-l. These data were
compiled from a number of different sources. Trip memoranda were pre-
pared describing the findings from the facilities visited during the
Phase II program. In addition, information gathered for certain facil-
ities during Phase I was reviewed and updated for incorporation into
summary Table A-l. We also included in this table the economic data
that were obtained by Bionetics, Inc. in their four site visits.
Summary Table A-l includes a description of the facility, a measure of
the size of the facility (number of persons or employees, square footage,
number of telephone lines, etc.), the Standard Industrial Classification
number (SIC), and descriptions of the types and numbers of electronic
and electrical control equipment found within the facilities. For each
type of equipment, we have assigned a severity index for both repair
and disruption, except for the facilities visited by Bionetics (see
Table 6-1), since they did not make such a distinction.
-The mean dosage for failure (E) for each type of equipment was
obtained from discussions with NASA-LRC and Bionetics personnel. The
range of airborne exposure transfer functions (AETF) values were
calculated from the information gathered during each site visit, and
the procedure used for calculating the AETF values was summarized in
the Phase I Report. (Reference 1, Chapter 2). The ranges of transfer
functions are presented both for summer and winter seasons. Under some
circumstances, it was necessary to consider a situation when windows
and doors might be open during pleasant weather.
For the severity indices assigned to the individual equipment in
each facility, there is a directly related repair and facility disrup-
A-l
-~-------~---------
tion cost. The schedule of costs for repairs is summarized in Table 6-2,
and the schedule for facility costs as a result of disruption is summa-
rized in Table 6-3. A discussion of the findings resulting from site
visits to a number of typical facilities is provided in' Appendix B.
A-2
. ~
TABLE A-l: Summary of Economic Data for Risk Analsyis
Mean Direct Cost
Facility and for Repair------------
Equipment Type Level for Number of Failure
__ £.E!1.iJ~_pLJ.!'E!12i~.!'_f!l!1f1jp!12 __ Each Fad1ityData Source (Sca le Factor) Repair Disruption Equipment
---L- __~ummer Winter ~ Disrupted Remarks
County & Ci ty l-Households Windows Open
Data Book TV/Stereo A 1 108
1
6 x 10-3 to 0.1 80 No HVAL,White Goods A 3 108 Windows closed 80 windows
Furna<:e A 1 108 0.0 to 9.6 X 10-3 80 have screens
2-Fi re & Po1i ce
SIC 9221 2-A Large Metropolitan Police
__ f2~!~Ql_~~~!~~_i~QQQ_P~~~2~~2
CRT terminals A 38 108 4.4 x 10-* to 0.15 4.4 x 10-* to 1.4 X 10-2 80
Teletype machines B 2 107 4.4 x 10-* to 0.15 4.4 x 10-* to 1.4 X 10-2 250
Miscellaneous equipment A 10 107 4.4 X 10-4 to 0.15 4.4 x 10-4 to 1.4 X 10-2 80
Radio control console B 9 108 4.4 X 10-4 to 0.15 4.4 x 10-4 to 1.4 X 10-2 250
Small computer line printer A 4 108 8.3 X 10-4 to 0.34 4.7 x 10-4 to 1.5 X 10-2 80
Large computer D A 1 107 8.3 X 10-4 to 0.34 4.7 x 10-4 to 1.5 X 10-2 2500 9000
Small computers C A 2 108 8.3 x 10-* to 0.34 4.7 x 10-4 to 1.5 X 10-2 800 - 9000
Radio transceivers in vehicles A 540 108 0.8 0.2 80 Allover city
Motor generator (large) C A 1 106 1.0 1.0 800
-
9000 Seldom used, tested wklyusage factor 0.01
PBx (sma11) C A 14 107 4.7 X 10-* to 1.5 X 10-2 800 - 9000
Radio transceivers B 35 108 0.0 to 6.7 X 10-3 250 Each precinct
SIC 9224 2-B Large Metropolitan Fire Control
__f~~!~~_i~Q_p~~~Q~l __________
Radio control consoles A 5 108 9.7 X 10-2 to 0.3 9.7 x 10-2 to 0.3 80
PBx (sma11) C B 1 107 7.4 X 10-2 to 0.2 7.4xlO-2 to 0.2 800 240
Motor generator (large) C A 1 106 0.3 to 1.0 0.3 to 1.0 800 80 Seldom used, tested wk1y
Motor generator (small) A C 2 107 0.3 to 1.0 0.3 to 1.0 80 1200 usage factor = 0.01
Radio transceivers B 3 108 5 X 10-3 to 0.2 0.0 to 9.5 X 10-3 250
Radio transceivers in vehicles A 200 108 0.8 0.2 80 Allover city
):::>
I
W
I..ABLE A-l: Sunillary of Economic Data for Risk Analsyis
Data Source
SIC 9221
Faci 1ity and
Equipment Type
(~call: Factor)
2-C Small Police Headquarters
__ nQJ~~!:~2!!~L _
Level for
Repair Disruption
Number of
Equi pment
t1ean
for
Fail ure
~
__ Q2:~~!_~9~! _
~epair
Each Facility
_l.9.P~ Di s rupted Remarks
Radio control console
Radio transceiver
Motor generator (small)
PBx (small)
Radio transceivers in vehicles
B 1 10 8 8.8 X 10-s to 0.6 8.8 x 10-s to 1.4 X 10-2 250
B 1 108 4.9 X 10-4 to 1.1 X 10- 3 0.0 to 1.1 X 10- 3 250
A B 1 106 0.5 0.5 80 120 Seldom used, tes ted wk1
C A 1 107 8.8 X 10-s to 0.6 8.8 x 10- 5 to 1.4 X 10-2 800 30 usage factor = 0.01
A 10 108 0.8 0.2 80
SIC 9224 2-D Small Fire Headquarters
__ i~Q_e~!:~~!!~2 _
Radio control console
PBx (small)
Radio transceivers
Radio transcievers in vehicles
Motor generator (small)
3-Post Office (Major sortiog area,
~ities > 10' people)
B
C
B
A
A
A
B
108 {WindOWs Open
107 6 x 1O- 3to 0.1 250 60Windows Closed
0.0 to 9.5 X 10- 3 800 60
1 108 4.9 X 10-4 to 1.1 X 10- 3 0.0 to 1.1 X 10-3 250
10 108 0.8 0.2 80 Allover city
1 106 0.5 0.5 80 240 Seldom used, tested wkl
usage factor = 0.01
Sorter without optical
character reader
Sorter with optical
cha racter reader
SIC 401, Am Publ. 4A-Subway
Transit Association
C
C
11
4.3 X 10- 4 to 3.9 X 10-2
800
800
Radio
Dri ve Motors
Schedule System
Auto fare coll.
PBx (small)
A
(computer-small) C
B
A
190- 108 1 x 10-2 to 0.8 80
1 107 4.3 X 10-4 to 7 X 10-2 800
3 107 1.2 X 10-2 to 0.6 250
1 107 4.3 X 10-4 to 7 X 10-2 800
"TABLE A-1: SUIl1JlIary of Economic Data for Risk Analsyis
Qata Source
SIC 401
Facil ity and
Equipment Type
(Scale Factor)
4-B B~!l~!?~~
CRT tenninals
Radio control console
Transceivers
PBx (small)
Mobile transceivers
Level for
Repair Disruption
A
B
B
C
A
Number of
Equipment
12
3
3
1
20
t1ean
for
Fail ure
~
2.4 X 10-3 to 2.3 X 10-2
2.4 X 10-3 to 2.3 X 10-2
2.4 X 10-3 to 2.3 X 10-2
7.0 X 10-3 to 3.0 X 10-2
7.0 X 10-3 to 0.5
Direct Cost
~e~dir------------
Each Fac~lity
~ Disruptei
80
250
250
800
80
Remarks
Not vulnerable on trains
SIC 3714 5-Manufacturer of Electronic and
__~~£~~~l£~!_~g~lp~~! ________
Transformer substation swi~ch (Critical) 2 108 1.6 X 10-2 65,800
Control circuit in PlOOll:ess:str.Eallls(Disruptive) 1 108 4 X 10-5 2,800
1 108 5 X 10-4 500
1 108 3 X 10-4 500
1 108 3 X 10-4 500
1 108 2 X 10-5 500
1 108 6 X 10-4 300
1 108 6 X 10-4 52,700
1 108 8 X 10-4 300
1 108 2 X 10-3 10,000
1 108 2 X 10-3 5,000
PBx (small) (Repair) 1 107 5 X 10-4 800
SIC 2824 6-§~~~r~!_~~~~f~~!~r~r~
6-A Q~2~~1£_El~~~~z_~!?~:~~!!~!!?~1~
Transformer switch or direct leaker(Disruptive) 6 108 1 X 10-3 93,000
1 108 1 X 10-3 98,000
1 108 1 X 10-3 41,000
Variable frequency controller 6 106 1 X 10-3 15,200
Motors and controller - chemical 24 107 1 x 10-3 28,400
Hydraulic power unit controller 1; 107 5 X 10-4 6,600
Temperature controller 60 108 5 X 10-4 3,400
Reference cells 24 107 5 x 10-5 6,700
Chemical control 36 107 5 x 10-4 5,300
Di gital speed control 2 106 5 X 10-4 1,700
PBx (Repair) 1 107 1 X 10-3 800
)::.
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SIC 3651
Facil ity and
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§~~~~~1_~~~f:l~~~~~~2
6-B Manufacturers of Electronic
__~9~!p~~~~_!~1~~!~!~~_~~~~!Y~~~
level for
Repair Disruption
Number of
~pment
t1can
for
Fail urc
---i-
Rdn~" of Transfer Functions
___Ii~~~c-~~~~~_~~-u_m_u-Wjnter
Direct Cost
:{-e"j;-a-i-r-un - u _
Each Facility
i.9P....!..:- P..i srupted Remarks
Mas~er oscillator controllers 1 106 7 X 10.3 16,360
Incoming inspection test equiplnent 3 106 7 X 10-3 6,330
Sma 11 computer 2 107 8 X 10-3 940
Assembly line signal interconnect 14 107 4 x 10-2 30
Injection mold temp. and pressure
cont ro11 ers 20 107 2 X 10-2 1,800
Encapsulation controller 1 108 2 X 10-3 1,040
Transformer switch or circuit breaker 16 108 6 x 10-5 26,200
In-process-plaster parts contamination 1 106 5 X 10-2 2.420
-spray paint contamination 1 106 8 X 10-2 3,760
-electronic component contamination 3500 106 4 x 10-3 1.10
-burn in 3500 106 4 x 10-3 1.00
-life test 100 107 3 x 10-3 250
PBx system (small) 1 107 1 X 10-3 800
Embossing temp. and press contro11 er5 20 107 6 X 10-4 230
SIC 2844 6-C !~!1~!_~~~p~~~!i2~~_1§QQ_~~p12l~~~2
Fork 1itt trucks A 10 106 0.0 to 0.12 80
Battery charger for trucks A 10 106 0.0 to 0.12 80
Programmable palletizer B 1 107 0.0 to 0.12 250
Transformer substation C 3 108 0.0 to 6 X 10-3 32,000 36,000
Injection mold heater controls A 24 106 0.0 to 6 X 10-3 80
Quality control instruments B 20 107 0.0 to 6 X 10-3 250
Computer facility (small) C 1 107 0.0 to 6 X 10-3 800
PBx (small) C 1 107 0.0 to 6 X 10- 3 800
TABLE A-l: Surmnary of Economic Data for Rish Allalsyis
Mean Direct Cost
for -----------------Facil i ty and :-"pili r
Equipment Type Level for Number of Fail ure __ ~E~9~_9f_I!~~~f~!_f~~~!j9~~ __ each Fa,ility
Data Source (Scale Factor) Repair Disruption Equipment -L- Summer Wi nter _E_clf.,t. Disrupted Remarks
SIC 481 7-Telephone Services
7-A Large Telephone Swi~ching
£~~!~!~_i~QQ!QQQ_!!~~~l __
Main switching center E 2 107 0.0 to 7.4 X 10-3 13,000
Dedicated telephone system C 1 107 0.0 to 7.4 X 10-3 800
Microwave link C 1 108 0.0 to 7.4 X 10-3 800
SIC 481 7-B Small Telephone Switching
Centers
-------------------------
Tel. PBx E 107 0.0 to 7.4 X 10-3 1,300
SIC 483 8-Radio/TV
Studio equipment C 1 107 0.0 to 5.0 X 10-2 800
Transformer and transmitter C 1 107 0.0 to 5.0 X 10- 2 800
Mobile mini-camera D 3 107 5.0 X 10-2 to 1.0 2,500
Control room D 1 107 0.0 to 5.0 )( 10-2 2,500
PBx (small) C 1 107 0.0 to 5.0 X 10-2 800
SIC 491 9-Electric Utility (185 Employees)
Control room C 2 107 0.0 to 1.2 x 10- 3 800
Control canputer (small ) C 1 108 0.0 to LOx 10- 3 800
SIC 531, 56. la-General Merchandise Retailers
57,59 10-A Main Store (1000 Employees;
§~§!QQQ_f!:l _______________
SIC 531 POS terminals B 200 108 6 X 10-3 to 2 X 10-2 250
Computer (l arge) D 1 108 0.0 to 2 x 10-" 2,50D
HVAC controls A 4 108 6 x 10- 3 to 2 X 10- 2 80
PBx (small) C 1 107 6 x 10- 3 to 2 X 10- 2 800
Motor generators (large) C 2 106 O. 1 to 1.0 800 Seldom used, tested weekly
factor = 0.01
TABLE A-1: SumJl\ary of Economi c Oatil for Risk Anal;yis
----
Mean Direct CostFacil i ty and for :<e-p-a-(r----- u - ----
Equipment Type Level for Number of Fa il ure --.!<9!}9~_9f_I.:9!}~f~.:_.fy!}~!j9!1~ __ Each FacilityData Source (Scale Fact..Q..d Repair Disruption Equipment
-.l...- Summer Wi nter -~~'- Di s rupted Remarks
SIC 531 lO-B Branch Store (250 Employees,
l~Q~QQQ_f!:l ________________
POS tenninals B 130 108 0_0 to 3 X 10-3 250
--Computer (small) C 1 108 0.0 to 3 X 10-3 800
Motor generators (large) C 2 106 0.1 to 1.0 800 Seldom used, tested
HVAC controls A 2 108 0.0 to 3 X 10-3 80 weekly, factor =0.01
PBx (small) C 1 107 0.0 to 3 X 10-3 800
SIC 541 lO-C Retail Grocers
--------------
POS tenninals B 12 108 9.4 x 10- 5 to 0.1 250
HVAC controls A 2 108 9.4 X 10- 5 to 0.1 80
SIC 602, 621, ll-Finance and Insurance
63 11:~__~r2~~r~2~_~2~~~_i!QQ_e~~2~~1
SIC 621 Computer (small) C C 5 108 0.0 to 1.0 X 10-4 800 6,000
Computer (small) C 1 10 8 0.0 to 6.0 X 10- 3 800
CRT & Keyboard display B 37 10 8 1.3 x 10-4to 1.0 x 10-2 250
PBx C 1 107 0.0 to 6.0 X 10- 3 800
General Office Equipment A 50 108 1.3 x lO-<tto 1.0 x 10-2 80
SIC 737 !!:~--£2~2~!~r_~~rY!£~~_i!QQ_e~r~2~~1
Computer (l arge) 0 C 1 108 0.0 to 7.0 X 10- 2 2,500 £,000
General Office Equipment A 100 108 4.0 X 10-4 to 7. Ox 10- 2 80
PBx (small) C 1 107 4.0 x 1O-4 to 7.0 x 10-2 800
12-R&O, Universities
Instruments A 100 10 0.0 to 6 X 10-3 80
PBx (small) C 1 10 0.0 to 6 X 10- 3 800
)::>
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Data Source
Facil ity and
Equipment Type
(Scale Factor)
13-Hospi ta1s
PBx
Generator (large)
X-Ray
Gen. lnstr. in Patient Area
Gen. lnst,. Operating Room
level for
flepair DisrupiJ~
C
C
C
B
B
Number of
Equipment
1
1
6
200
50
Mean
for
Fail ure
--E-
0.0 to 6.6 X 10- 3
0.2 when running
0.0 to 3.3 X 10- 3
Windows open
2.8 x 10- 3 to 5.6 X 10- 2
Windows closed
0.0 to 6.6 X 10- 3
0.0 to 3.5 x 10-"
Direct Cost
:{-e-p-a-i-r-uun - _n_
Each Facility
-.i<lP..!.:- Di srupted
800
800
800
250
250
250
Remarks
Seldom used, tested
weekly, usage factor 0.01
l4-Automotive Assembly
14-A ~~~Q~Q~!1~_~~~~~]l_1~QQQ_~~pl~2
Computer system (large) C
Programmable automotive welders C
Spray paint drying tunnel A
Assembly line controllers C
Transformers &switchers
Transformer circuit &breaker
110 v. auxillary transformer ~epair)
Spot welder controls
welder control s
Teletype printer controls
Electronic harness contr. tester
Electrostatic paint controller
PBx (small)
Automatic welder controls
SIC 3711
SIC 3711
I:r:=-
I
\.0
PBx (small)
14-B !~~~~_~~~~~~ll
Transformer switches
C
(Critical)
A
A
A
A
B
1
2
1
2
8
9
9
12
50
2
15
1
8
1
2
107 1.5 X 10-3 to 1.5 X 10-2 800 12,000
107 6.4 x 10-2 to 0.14 800 12,000
101 0.0 to 3.5 x 10-" 80 12,000
107 6.4 x 10-2 to 0.14 800 12,000
108 1.5 x 10-" to 1 X 10-2 32,000 48.000
10 7 1. 5 x 10-3 to 1.5 X 10-2 800
10 8 1 x 10-3 430,000
108 1 x 10-" 42,000
108 5 x 10-3 6,800
106 3 x 10-1 1,700
10 6 2 x 10-2 1,900
10 7 2 x lO-s 900
10 8 1 X 10-2 1,700
10 8 1 x 10-" 1,700
10 7 1 X 10-2 800
10 7 2 x 10- 5 42,000
TABLE A-l: Summary of Economic Data for Risk Analsyis
Mean Direct CostFacility and for ~epai-r-----------
Equipment Type !-evel for Number of Fail ure -_.!<~!l9~_gLI.!'~!I.?f~.!'_EY!ls.tjg!l.?__ Each FacilityData Source (Sea le Fact.Q.d Repai r Disruption Equipmen!-
----E- Summer Winter
_l9P..!..:.. Disrupted Remarks
15-Aviation
, 15-A ~!!:~!:~f! Ll:Jors closed (95%),
Cabin C 20 108 0.0 to 9 X 10-4 800I Inst.
Ll:Jors opened (5%)Av·ion;cs 0 40 108 0.16to 0.68 2,500
15-B ~g~!~gl_!g~~~_~_~!~eg~!
Computer (small) C 1 107 0.0 to 6.5 X 10-3 800
Radios B 10 108 0.0 to 6.5 X 10-3 250
Consoles B 10 107 0.0 to 6.5 X 10-3 250
CRT A 10 108 0.0 to 6.5 X 10-3 80
15-C ~~~~~~~~~_!~~!~~l_~_~!~eg~!
X-Ray C 14 108 0.0 to 1.0 X 10-2 800
TIV B 89 107 0.0 to 1.0 X 10-2 250
Printers A 30 108 ::::·0.0 to 1.0 x 10-2 80
CRT A 48 108 0.0 to 1.0 X 10-2 80
15-0 ~~~:E!~l~_~~~~~_~L~!~eg!,!~
ASR 0 107 0.0 to 1.0 X 10-2 2,500
~Q~_~!_~!~eg~!
LOC 0 3 108 0.0 to 1.0 X 10-2 2,500
~Q~-~!_~!~g!,!
VOR 0 108 0.0 to 1.0 X 10-2 2,500
)::0
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APPENDIX B
VULNERABILITY OF MAJOR FACILITY CATEGORIES
B.l MANUFACTURING
• Manufacturer of Electronic and Mechanical Equipment
For this manufacturer, surveyed by Bionetics, Inc., of printed
circuit electronic control units~ automotive fuel injectors,
and automotive air injection pumps, the two main power trans-
formers were considered critically vulnerable to carbon fibers.
Loss of either transformer would cause disruption in production
that could not readily be made up, some product loss, and con-
siderable repair and/or replacement costs. Key control circuit
elements in the process streams in this plant could be disruptive
should they become infested with carbon fibers. The specific
circuits, should they fail, would result in widely varying costs
for disruption depending upon the equipment affected, the. com-
plexity and value of the product, and the replacement and/or
repair costs. The facility telephone system was vulnerable.
• Manufacturer of Organic Fibers
This facility, surveyed by Bionetics, Inc., contained a continuous
flow process for manufacture of carpet fibers that would be
extremely expensive in terms of manufacturing disruption and clean-
up should the plant power be disrupted or key control elements
damaged by carbon fibers. Eight enclosed transformer switches
and/or circuit breakers were found to have high potential for
losses but only at extremely high carbon fiber exposures. Process
controls located throughout the plant were identified which had
potential for disruption of production or loss of product, and would
require substantial repair and/or replacement costs. Some of the
equipment had low values for E and relatively high transfer
functions which would indicate that the facility is vulnerable
to carbon fiber exposures~
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• Manufacturer of Television Receivers
This facility, visited by Bionetics? Inc. contained the assembly
line for a full range of domestic black and white and color tel-
evision receivers. The sixteen main transformer'switches and
circuit breakers had a high potential for disrupting the produc-
tion at considerable cost, but had an extremely high E and a
very low transfer function, which combined to require an extremely
high exposure before losses could be expected. Although there
were a large number of in-process manufactured items that were
vulnerable to contamination by carbon fibers, the repair costs
per ~nit were very low. Several key pieces of calibration and
test electronic equipment were found which had low Ebut were
located within carefully controlled environmental areas with
low transfer functions. The factory telephone system was found
vulnerable to carbon fiber exposure.
• Manufacturer of Toilet Preparations
This modern formulation and packaging factory contained almost
100% explosion proof electrical control equipment in the product
filling areas, and a superior air filtration system throughout
the factory (with the exception of the warehouse) that made the
whole facility virtually impervious to carbon fiber exposures.
A programmable automatic box palletizer located in the unfiltered
air of the warehouse was considered slightly vulnerable but the
repair costs were minimal.
• Automobile Assembly Plant
The facility visited employed approximately 4,000 persons and
received in bulk all of the components required for assembly of
large domestic automobiles. No manufacturing of components is
done in the plant. The large computer system used for scheduling
the details of how each automobile is assembled and for handling
all of the production scheduling and paper work associated with
such a large assembly plant, was vulnerable to carbon fibers.
A similar computer located at another facility within the same
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city was avail able for back-up. Faci 1ity di srupti on costs woul d
be expected as well as diagnostic and repair costs. The pro-
grammable automatic spot welders for assembling body panels were
vulnerable. The spray paint drying tunnel would be vulnerable
if any carbon fibers could get past a triple air filtration
system of very high quality. The paint on as many as 12 automo-
biles could be damaged by an instantaneous infestation by fibers.
Each unit would then have to be individually spot repaired in
order to complete final inspection. The assembly line speed
controllers, located in sealed cabinets are critical to the
operation of the assembly line and productivity would be lost
during a prolonged outage. However, outages from a few minutes to
several hours are experienced regularly. Eight transformers and
switches located throughout the plant are critical to the opera-
tion and facility disruption cost can be expected as well as
sizeable repair costs for carbon fiber damages. However, as
with all transformers and switch gear, the E for this equipment
is extremely high and the probability of loss is extremely low.
As with most organizations, the telephone system was vulnerable.
• Truck Assembly Plant
This facility, visited by Bionetics, Inc., assembles light duty
full sized pick-up trucks for one of the major U.S. manufacturers.
The nine main transformer switches and circuit breakers are
critical to the plant operation, and loss of individual units
will result in very high disruption costs associated with loss
of production, loss of wages, and diagnostic and repair costs.
This equipment, although not particularly vulnerable to carbon
fibers, was enclosed and provided good year round protection
against infestation. The automatic welder controls for body
panel assembly appeared to be vulnerable but were located within
an area where the transfer function for carbon fibers was'
extremely low, implying low probability of failure. A variety of
other equipment including spot welders, welder controls, a tele-
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type printer, electronic harness continuity testers and the
electrostatic paint spray control would all be subject to
interruption with carbon fibers and had identifiable facility
disruption and diagnostic and repair costs. So~e of the equip-
ment such as welder controls had low E's and were not very well
protected against dirt and carbon fiber infestation. The pro-
bability of this equipment failing was high. but back-up units
were available both on the line and in the repair shops. princi-
pally because normal failure rates for this equipment is high.
Loss of the equipment would result in diagnostic and repair costs
with minimal loss of productivity.
B.2 TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION
• Post Offices
Major post office sorting centers have two types of mini-computer-
controlled letter sorters: optical character readers and more
conventional visual-read sorting machines. Failure of equipment
for a short period of time would result in delayed service but
no revenue loss or cost increases of any significance. Therefore.
only repair costs were considered for this category.
• Subway, Railroads
The vulnerability of a subway system depends upon whether it is
a II new ll system (constructed in the 1970s or later) or an older
system. New systems like the BART system in San Francisco. the
WMATA in Washington. D.C .• or the MARTA system in Atlanta. all
rely upon sophisticated electronic control equipment for operation
of the system and the individual cars. Great reliance is placed
upon a central computer for controlling and scheduling the various
trains. Such systems will be at higher risk potential as a result
of carbon fiber exposure. Disruptive losses of service can
be expected and some loss of revenue will occu~ especially if
emergency backup systems cannot be brought into action and if
manual control of trains and systems cannot be activated. Repair
costs will be high.
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However, most subway systems are much older, and have manually
operated trains with simple basic control systems that are
virtually immune to dirt and thus to carbon fibers. The
computer systems in both new and old subway systems are
usually maintained in modern clean facilities where care
is taken to protect the equipment from dirt and dust.
The rolling stock of railroads, whether diesel or electrified,
is virtually invulnerable to carbon fibers. Modern diesel
locomotives derive the cooling air for all of the electronic
controls from the well-filtered air that feeds the diesel
engines. Miscellaneous two-way radio control systems are
used for direct communication with trains both on the road
and in the yard. These systems have proven low vulnerability
to carbon fibers. The railroad signal control system (the
block system) is almost impervious to carbon fibers and,
should a failure occur, would simply cause minor schedule
delays on all but the most heavily travelled corridors.
Repair costs would be low, especially when compared with the
annual budget of the signal and communication department of
most railroads.
All of the telephone equipment, especially the switching
control rooms, are vulnerable to carbon fibers. Some dis-
ruption in service can be expected and repair costs (to be
charged against the telephone company and not against the
specific business establishment) are expected .
• Large Telephone Switching Centers (200,000 lines) and Small
Telephone Switching Centers
For all of the centralized telephone systems, the switching
equipment is vulnerable to both single and multiple carbon
fibers. Infestation will cause widely scattered disruption
in service that is characterized by the inability of a
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Large and Small Telephone Switching Centers -Continued
circuit to complete a call. Alternative circuits may come
into action or the customer may simply be diverted until -
an alternative circuit can be found. Costs associated with
disruption will be for diagnosing and cleaning the contacts
on relays and multiple-pin junction boxes.
• Radio/Television
In this industry, the studio equipment, the control room,
the mobile mini-cameras and the main transmitter are all
vulnerable to carbon fibers. The studio equipment, the
transmitter and the control room are all located within
fully air conditioned areas, where exposure to fibers is
expected to be low. The mobile equipment is subject to
heavy exposure when in use. In the event of facility
disruption, back-up equipment can be used and there is no
loss in revenue. Costs are associated with the diagnosis
and repair of individual equipment when exposed.
B.3 GENERAL MERCHANDISE RETAILERS
• Major Department Store
In the modern facility that was visited, there were approx-
imately 200 point of sale (POS) terminals that were considered
vulnerable to carbon fibers. These units were connected to
a large computer that keeps track of individual sales, the
merchandise sold, the inventory, and a host of other informa-
tion required for operating such businesses. The loss of
individual POS terminals was not considered disruptive but
would only cause some loss of efficiency. Multiple pas term-
inals in each department could be used in the event that one
is out of action. A number of back-up units were maintained
in the repair shop. The computer was located in an environ-
mentally controlled room where exposure to carbon fibers was
extremely low. The HVAC controls and the telephone system
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were considered vulnerable but they are both enclosed within
fully air conditioned and filtered areas within the building.
The probability of significant disruption of a main store by
carbon fiber infestation is very low.
• Branch Store
A branch store of the main store located in a suburban
setting also had a low probability for disruption by carbon
fibers. In the event of carbon fiber infestation, some
repair costs might be expected.
• Retail Grocers
Retail grocery stores also have point of sale terminals and
HVAC controls. Normally they do not have a centralized
computer. Some pas terminals now have automatic equipment
for reading the universal product identification code and
automatic computation of the bill. Loss of individual pas
terminals would result in delay at check-out but no signifi-
cant disruption in productivity or loss of revenue. Costs
for carbon fiber infestation would be restricted to the
diagnosis and repair of equipment.
B.4 FINANCE AND INSURANCE
• Brokerage House
The facility visited was a branch office of a large national
company with a staff of about 100 persons. The office con-
tained two small computers. One critical to the operation
contained the account information for local patrons. Loss of
this computer would disrupt activities in the local area and
make it difficult for brokers to rapidly review the content
of clients accounts. Brokers could still place orders through
a keyboard terminal that is directly connected to the New
York office. Several back-up terminals were available for
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overload or breakdown. Each pair of brokers had a keyboard
and CRT display for access to the computer. These terminals
are critical to the operation. However, loss of individual
units due to carbon fibers could be handled by doubling up
on the remaining units. Several spare units were available
at unoccupied desks and others were readily available through
an outside service organization.
The telephone system is vital to the operation of a brokerage
house and it is maintained by the local telephone company.
All of the telephone equipment was judged vulnerable to carbon
fibers. Much of the switching equipment was located in out-
of-the-way rooms that were part of the building structure where
the brokerage house is located. In the event of carbon fiber
infestation of the computer, facility disruption costs can be
expected. All other carbon fiber damage would simply reduce
the efficiency of the office slightly and would result in
costs for diagnosis and repair of equipment.
• Computer Services
As in the case of the brokerage house, computer service com-
panies usually have one large computer that is critical to
their operation and unscheduled loss of the computer for periods
longer than a few hours can be disruptive to the operation.
Both disruption and diagnosis and repair costs could be expected.
General office equipment and the telephone equipment are also
vulnerable to carbon fibers and they would require diagnosis
and repair costs.
B.5 PUBLIC SERVICES
• Electric Utility
A major generating station for a metropolitan electric utility
was visited. All of the outside transformer and switch gear
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Electric Utility ~ Continued
were judged invulnerable to all but yard-long strands of
carbon fibers. The control room for the boilers and the
turbine generators in each unit of the generating station
contained a large number of electronic, electro-pneumatic
and mechanical control circuits and read-out devices whose
disruption by carbon fibers would require that the operators
switch to other back-up control systems for maintaining
service. Affected equipment could either be repaired on the
spot or replaced with standby units from the instrument repair
shop. A small control computer was used as a supplement for
controlling the operation. The whole facility appeared to be
almost insensitive to carbon fiber infestation.
• Electronic R&D Labs, Universities, Colleges
In these institutions, scientific and support-type instru-
mentation was judged to be vulnerable. However, since these
organizations are not profit-oriented and the pace of activi-
ties is often moderate, equipment failures would lead at
worse to activity delays. Thus, only diagnostic and repair
costs can be expected for equipment in these facilities.
• Hospitals
Several categories of support equipment were included for
hospitals. While in rare instances some combinations of equip-
ment failures would put human life at risk, probabilities of
such occurrences could not clearly be identified because of
various back-up procedures. Similarly~ increases in direct
cost resulting from failure could not be clearly identified.
Therefore, only the diagnostic and repair costs were included
in the economic analysis.
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• Fire and Police Services
A distinction was made within this category between large metro-
politan police control systems and small pol ice. headquarters ,
and between large metropolitan fire control centers and small
town fire headquarters. The major distinction between large
and small police control centers are that the large police
control centers use computers, both large and small, for storage
and manipulation of critical information and for monitoring the
activities of the various precinct stations located throughout a
city. CRT terminals and displays are used extensively as input/
output modules for these computers. Multiple radio control
consoles are used for communication with various precincts and
with individual patrol cars. A large PBX telephone exchange
is a key element that is vulnerable to carbon fibers.
In smaller police stations, all activities are monitored by a
single police dispatcher who will utilize one or two radio
control consoles and remotely located radio transceivers. The
telephone equipment is limited to a few trunk lines. Disruptions
in the service of both large and small police stations occur if
the telephone system is i nterrupted~, or if thei r emergency standby
generators are not operational when there is a need for them
(this is a very rare occurrence). For large metropolitan police
departments, disruptions will occur if any of the computer
systems become inoperable.
Large metropolitan fire control centers and small town fire
headquarters are not particularly vulnerable to communication
system failures because there are three separate channels for
communication, 1) the hard-wired fire alarm system which was
judged to be invulnerable to carbon fibers, 2) the public
telephone system, and 3) the fire and police radio communication
networks. The telephone system is by far the most vulnerable
of these three communication links and, minor service disruptions
can be expected.
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